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HIPAA: CAUGHT IN THE CROSS FIRE 
STEPHANIE E. PEARL† 
ABSTRACT 
  The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) is nearly synonymous with patient privacy. In contrast, the 
National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS), a 
provision of the Gun Control Act of 1968, demands the disclosure of 
information about individuals, including mental-health information, 
that may prohibit their purchase of firearms. 
  These two statutes raise the following question: what if NICS 
requires or recommends the reporting of information protected by 
HIPAA? In the wake of recent gun violence by mentally disabled 
individuals, governmental and nongovernmental organizations have 
questioned whether HIPAA’s privacy provisions have stultified 
national gun-control measures by prohibiting the reporting of mental-
health information. In early 2014, the Department of Health and 
Human Services responded to these concerns by proposing a rule that 
would grant an exception to HIPAA’s privacy protection to allow the 
reporting of relevant mental-health records to NICS.  
  This Note questions whether there is an insurmountable conflict 
between HIPAA and the Gun Control Act that warrants the proposed 
exception. It analyzes the NICS-reporting practices of certain states to 
explain how existing federal NICS-reporting laws can be used to 
clarify federal NICS-submission standards and argues that the 
proposed rule is legally trivial. 
INTRODUCTION 
“[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on 
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons 
and the mentally ill . . . .” − District of Columbia v. Heller1 
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On a Tuesday morning in March 2002,2 Peter J. Troy, a thirty-
four-year-old “sporadic college student,”3 walked into morning Mass 
at a church in Lynbrook, New York, removed a .22-caliber rifle from 
his coat, and fatally shot Reverend Lawrence M. Penzes, fifty, and 
Eileen Tosner, seventy-three.4 Troy’s list of twenty-four names on the 
“Lynbrook Church Death List”—a list of the parishioners he planned 
to kill—was one of the few pieces of information revealed about him.5 
Troy was arraigned on March 13, 2002, at Nassau County District 
Court in Hempstead, New York, and pled not guilty to the charges.6 
On June 26, 2003, after only about one hour of deliberation, a jury 
found him guilty on two counts of first-degree murder,7 and he was 
sentenced to two life sentences without parole.8 
In the years before the shooting at the Lynbrook church, Troy 
had been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and committed to 
inpatient psychiatric wards in both New York City and Nassau 
County.9 Following his discharge, Troy was taking psychotropic 
medication and was supposed to be checked on regularly by mental-
health workers; they failed to do so, however, and his case was 
eventually closed.10 Despite his prior commitment,11 Troy was able to 
legally purchase the gun he used in the shooting and had passed the 
mandatory federal background-check system, known as the National 
 
 1. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008). 
 2. Short Form Order at 2, Tosner v. Nassau Cnty., No. 3283/04 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 23, 
2007), available at http://decisions.courts.state.ny.us/10jd/nassau/decisions/index/index_new/
lamarca/2007jun/003283-04.pdf.  
 3. Daniel J. Wakin & Bruce Lambert, Police Say Suspect in Church Killings Kept a ‘Death 
List,’ N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2002, at B1. 
 4. Id.  
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Bruce Lambert, L.I. Man Convicted in Killing of a Priest and a Parishioner, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 26, 2003, at B8. 
 8. Short Form Order, supra note 2, at 2. 
 9. Lambert, supra note 7, at B8. 
 10. Id.; see also Short Form Order, supra note 2, at 2 (claiming that Troy, “an individual 
with a long history of mental illness,” had been “improperly released from the care” of a 
hospital after representing a “clear and present danger to himself and others”). 
 11. NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 (NIAA), Pub. L. No. 110-180 § 2, 121 
Stat. 2559, 2560 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922 note (2012)) (citing the Lynbrook 
Church shooting incident and the shooter’s improper purchase of a gun—due to his prior 
mental-health commitment—as indicative of a need to increase the amount of mental-health 
information provided to NICS).  
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Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS).12 At trial, Troy’s 
attorney urged him to enter a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, 
but Troy refused.13 
The shooting at the Lynbrook church is one of a handful of high-
profile cases in which an individual with a history of mental illness 
fatally shot someone after slipping through the cracks of the federal 
background-check system.14 Along with the Virginia Tech shooting in 
April of 2007,15 Congress cited the Lynbrook church shooting as a key 
impetus for passing the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 
(NIAA).16 Since the passage of the NIAA, however, additional 
shootings by individuals suffering from mental illness have led 
American citizens, lawmakers, and policy advocates to question 
whether there are corollaries between mental illness and fatal 
violence,17 and to look critically at the effectiveness of NICS.18 
Government agencies and private organizations, such as the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) and Mayors Against 
Illegal Guns have independently concluded that one of the main 
weaknesses with NICS is the dearth of mental-health records.19 These 
 
 12. Id. Section 103 of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady Act) mandates 
the creation of NICS. Pub. L. No. 103-159 § 103, 107 Stat. 1536, 1536 (1993) (codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 922(9)(t)(1) (2012)). 
 13. Lambert, supra note 7, at B8. 
 14. NIAA § 2. 
 15. In 2007, a student at Virginia Polytechnic Institute shot and killed thirty-two students 
and faculty before taking his own life. Id. Over a year earlier, a special justice, designated by the 
Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Virginia, had ruled that the student, Seung Hui Cho, 
“present[ed] an imminent danger to himself as a result of mental illness,” and ordered that he 
receive outpatient treatment and “follow all recommended treatments.” VA. TECH REVIEW 
PANEL, MASS SHOOTINGS AT VIRGINIA TECH: REPORT OF THE REVIEW PANEL 48 (2007), 
available at http://www.schoolshooters.info/PL/Official_Reports_files/FullReport.pdf.  
 16. See NIAA § 2 (discussing Congress’s findings on NICS’s effectiveness in keeping guns 
out of the hands of those who are considered dangerous and mentally ill). 
 17. See, e.g., Lindsey Lewis, Mental Illness, Propensity for Violence, and the Gun Control 
Act, 11 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 149, 150–54 (2011) (examining whether individuals with 
mental illness have a propensity for violence); Katherine L. Record & Lawrence O. Gostin, 
Dangerous People or Dangerous Weapons: Keeping Arms Away from the Dangerous in the 
Wake of an Expansive Reading of the Second Amendment, 37 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 8, 8–10 
(2012). 
 18. See, e.g., Jeff Brady, States Aren’t Submitting Records to Gun Database, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (Apr. 16, 2012, 12:44 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/08/16/158932528/states-arent-
submitting-records-to-gun-database (questioning NICS’s effectiveness and asking why states do 
not submit mental-health records).  
 19. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-684, GUN CONTROL: SHARING 
PROMISING PRACTICES AND ASSESSING INCENTIVES COULD BETTER POSITION JUSTICE TO 
ASSIST STATES IN PROVIDING RECORDS FOR BACKGROUND CHECKS 13 (2012) (explaining 
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entities found that states have purportedly failed to submit mental-
health records due in part to concerns that the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act’s Privacy Rule20 (HIPAA Privacy 
Rule) forbids such action.21 Reports issued by these organizations also 
describe the technological, legal, and coordination challenges of 
reporting as having impacted states’ ability to make mental-health 
records available to NICS.22 Although some states and media sources 
noted in response to the GAO’s report that HIPAA’s privacy 
restrictions might be an impediment to NICS reporting,23 it was not 
until the shootings in Aurora, Colorado,24 and Newtown, 
Connecticut,25 that the federal executive branch became concerned 
with the possible barriers to reporting created by HIPAA.26 
 
that “states that have not enacted laws requiring state agencies to share their mental health 
records” might face reporting challenges due to HIPAA); MAYORS AGAINST ILLEGAL GUNS, 
FATAL GAPS: HOW MISSING RECORDS IN THE FEDERAL BACKGROUND CHECK SYSTEM PUT 
GUNS IN THE HANDS OF KILLERS, at 32, 42, 43, 46, 50, 58 (2011), available at 
https://ia601004.us.archive.org/20/items/542982-fatal-gaps-mayors-against-illegal-guns/542982-
fatal-gaps-mayors-against-illegal-guns.pdf (noting that some states are concerned that HIPAA 
serves as a barrier to mental-health-prohibitor reporting). 
 20. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C. 
(2012)); The HIPAA Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 subpart A, E (2014). 
 21. See supra note 19. 
 22. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 19, at 11; MAYORS AGAINST 
ILLEGAL GUNS, supra note 19, at 14–21. 
 23. See, e.g., James B. Jacobs & Jennifer Jones, Keeping Firearms out of the Hands of the 
Dangerous Mentally Ill, 37 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 11, 11–12 (2012) (noting that although 
states are concerned that HIPAA acts as a barrier to NICS reporting, it does not); John 
DiStaso, Pro-Gun Attorney: NH Not Keeping Guns from Mentally Ill, N.H. UNION LEADER 
(Dec. 17, 2012, 9:57 PM), http://www.unionleader.com/article/20121218/NEWS03/121219235 
(describing New Hampshire Assistant Commissioner of Safety’s concern that when an arms 
seller calls for a NICS check, HIPAA often prevents the department from determining whether 
a potential buyer has been released from the “State Hospital” or is “in intensive treatment for 
mental health” (quotations omitted)). It should be noted, however, that the concern here is with 
not knowing about voluntary, not involuntary, commitments; Michael S. Schmidt & Charlie 
Savage, Gaps in F.B.I. Data Undercut Background Checks for Guns, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2012, 
at A1 (identifying state privacy laws as a barrier). Most of the sources published before 
President Obama’s January 2013 executive action—which demanded that HIPAA not be a 
barrier to mental-health submission, see infra note 26 and accompanying text—focused on 
barriers to mental-health submission besides HIPAA. Id. 
 24. Dan Frosch & Kirk Johnson, Gunman Kills 12 at Colorado Theater; Scores Are 
Wounded, Reviving Debate, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2012, at A1. 
 25. James Barron, Gunman Massacres 20 Children at School in Connecticut; 28 Dead, 
Including Killer, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2012, at A1. 
 26. OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE, NOW IS THE TIME: GUN VIOLENCE REDUCTION 
EXECUTIVE ACTIONS 2 (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/
wh_now_is_the_time_actions.pdf. 
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Following the 2012 Newtown shooting, Leon Rodriguez, 
Director of Health and Human Services’s (HHS’s) Office for Civil 
Rights (OCR), responded to concerns about HIPAA’s impact on the 
reporting of mental-health data by reiterating that the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule struck the appropriate balance between protecting the 
privacy of patients’ health information and disclosing the necessary 
information to treat the patient and “protect the nation’s public 
health.”27 Rodriguez emphasized that under HIPAA, a provider is 
allowed to disclose information to a third party that his patient is 
threatening him with serious harm if necessary to protect the health 
and safety of the third party.28 Despite Rodriguez’s assurances, soon 
thereafter President Barack Obama published twenty-three executive 
actions dedicated to reducing gun violence.29 These actions included 
the removal of any unnecessary legal barriers in HIPAA that “may 
prevent states from making information available”30 to NICS, such as 
“relevant information on people prohibited from gun ownership for 
mental-health reasons.”31 
In light of the President’s executive actions, the OCR issued an 
advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) on April 23, 
2013.32 The ANPRM proposed creating an express permission in the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule allowing HIPAA-covered entities responsible 
for involuntary commitments or formal adjudications to disclose to 
NICS the identities of persons who had been involuntarily committed 
or formally adjudicated as having a “serious mental condition.”33 
 
 27. Letter from Leon Rodriguez, Dir. Office of Civil Rights, Dep’t of Health and Human 
Servs., to the Nation’s Health Care Providers (Jan. 15, 2013) (citing 45 C.F.R. 164.512(j)(1)(i) 
(2012)), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/office/lettertonationhcp.pdf. 
 28. Id. Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California first established the duty of 
licensed mental-health professionals to warn individuals who have been specifically threatened 
by a patient. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 529 P.2d 553, 559 (Cal. 1974), vacated, 551 
P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976); see also Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 345 (Cal. 
1976) (en banc) (establishing that the duty to warn includes the broader “duty to protect”). 
Most states now recognize a duty to protect or warn targeted potential victims. George C. 
Harris, The Dangerous Patient Exception to the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege: The Tarasoff 
Duty and the Jaffee Footnote, 74 WASH. L. REV. 33, 47 (1999).  
 29. OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 26, at 4. 
 30. Id. 
 31. OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE, NOW IS THE TIME: THE PRESIDENT’S PLAN TO 
PROTECT OUR CHILDREN AND OUR COMMUNITIES BY REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE 4 (2013), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/wh_now_is_the_time_full.pdf.  
 32. HIPAA Privacy Rule and the National Instant Criminal Background Check System 
(NICS), 78 Fed. Reg. 23,872 (proposed Apr. 23, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164). 
 33. Id. 
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Currently, NICS uses the information regarding involuntary 
commitments and adjudications of mental deficiency, which is 
reported from non-HIPAA-covered courts, states, and entities,34 to 
recognize and tag in the NICS database those individuals who cannot 
purchase a gun due to mental-health concerns.35 This tag—known in 
NICS as a “prohibitor”—represents “the condition or factor that 
prohibits an individual from possessing or receiving firearms.”36 
After an opportunity for public comment and response, a notice 
of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), calling for the same HIPAA 
exception for NICS reporting, was published in the Federal Register 
on January 7, 2014 (HIPAA-NICS NPRM).37 As of this Note’s 
 
 34. Non-HIPAA-covered courts, states, and entities are those that do not use or transmit 
electronic medical information. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2012). For a more in-depth discussion, see 
infra notes 130–35 and accompanying text. 
 35. HIPAA Privacy Rule and the National Instant Criminal Background Check System 
(NICS), 78 Fed. Reg. at 23,875. When states or other entities submit mental-health information 
to NICS, they provide demographic information about the individual. This information is run 
through several federal databases, see infra notes 61–62 (describing other federal databases that 
NICS searches, which have compiled federal, state, and international data), to determine almost 
instantaneously if there is a block on the individual such that he is unable to purchase a firearm. 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 19, at 2 n.4. The actual treatment records, 
other health-care records, and any specifics concerning the individual’s mental-health condition 
are not provided to NICS. Id. The term “mental-health records,” as used throughout this Note, 
should be understood in this context.  
 36. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 19, at 6. Other prohibitors apply in 
the following situations: when the individual is “under indictment for, or [has] been convicted in 
any court of a crime, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(d)(1) (2012); is “a fugitive from justice,” id. § 922(d)(2); is “an unlawful user of or 
addicted to any controlled substance,” id. § 922(d)(3); has “been adjudicated as a mental 
defective or committed to any mental institution,” id. § 922(d)(4); is “illegally or unlawfully in 
the United States,” id. § 922(d)(5)(A); has “been discharged from the Armed Forces under 
dishonorable conditions,” id. § 922(d)(6); “having been a citizen of the United States,” 
renounces his or her U.S. citizenship, id. § 922(d)(7); is “subject to a court order that restrains 
[him or her] from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner” or the child of an 
intimate partner, id. § 922(d)(8); or has “been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of 
domestic violence,” id. § 922(d)(9). 
 37. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule and the 
National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS), 79 Fed. Reg. 784 (proposed Jan. 
7, 2014) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 164). Any textual revisions between the ANPRM and 
the NPRM were minor and did not alter the substance of the original ANPRM. This Note 
addresses only those comments that are most pertinent to the arguments presented here. In 
addition, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) issued a proposed 
rule that has since been codified clarifying the definition of “adjudicated as a mental defective” 
and amending the definition of “committed to a mental institution” to include “both inpatient 
and outpatient treatment.” Amended Definition of “Adjudicated as a Mental Defective” and 
“Committed to a Mental Institution,” 79 Fed. Reg. 774, 775 (proposed Jan. 7, 2014) (codified at 
27 C.F.R. pt. 478 (2014)).  
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publication, HHS has taken no additional action to finalize this 
regulation,38 and governmental and nongovernmental organizations 
continue to question its legality and usefulness.39 This Note focuses on 
this proposed exception to HIPAA and its questionable effectiveness 
at remedying the relationship between the Gun Control Act of 196840 
and HIPAA. 
This Note argues that any perceived conflict between the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule and the Gun Control Act—which the HIPAA-
NICS NPRM seeks to remedy—is more or less imagined. Although 
states’ failure to report mental-health information to NICS raises 
valid concerns, this dearth of reporting is due not to any reporting 
limitations embedded in HIPAA. Rather, it is due to a lack of clarity 
from the federal government as to what information should be 
reported under the Gun Control Act and NICS, and as to the roles of 
the federal and state governments in coordinating the submission of 
mental-health data to NICS. This Note shows that the proposed 
regulation is unnecessary and does nothing to clarify the 
circumstances under which a state may submit mental-health records 
to NICS. Instead, it is a rushed example of rulemaking that points the 
proverbial finger at a vague statute, HIPAA, without determining 
whether HIPAA, specifically, the HIPAA Privacy Rule, actually 
serves as a barrier to states’ submission of mental-health records to 
NICS. 
This Note proceeds in five parts. Part I provides background 
information on NICS by exploring its statutory history—including the 
Gun Control Act, the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 
1993 (Brady Act), and the NIAA. Part II examines the corresponding 
roles of the state and federal governments in submitting NICS 
information. Part III provides an overview of the HIPAA Privacy 
Rule and outlines existing HIPAA exceptions that might alleviate 
concerns of a HIPAA–NICS conflict. In light of this information, Part 
 
 38. HIPAA Privacy Rule and the National Instant Criminal Background Check System 
(NICS), U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/
understanding/special/NICS (last visited Nov. 18, 2014).  
 39. See, e.g., Letter from Herbert W. Titus, attorney at William J. Olson, P.C., on behalf of 
the Gun Owners Found., to the U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. 3–4 (Mar. 10, 2014), 
available at http://gunowners.com/pdf/GOF.HIPAA.NICS.20140310.pdf (critiquing the 
proposed rule as “[u]nnecessary and [u]nenforceable,” and suggesting that states’ low reporting 
to NICS may be better explained by “disagree[ment] with the Obama administration’s high-
handed anti-gun policies” than by a HIPAA-based barrier). 
 40. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. §§ 921–928 (2012) and in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (2012)). 
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IV analyzes the helpfulness of the HIPAA-NICS NPRM, setting forth 
the strongest arguments against its publication as a final rule. Part V 
moves beyond the HIPAA-NICS NPRM and offers 
recommendations as to how the federal government can improve 
NICS reporting based on current state solutions, as well as alternative 
proposals that might address NICS’s weaknesses more effectively. 
I.  NICS: ENCOURAGING DISCLOSURE TO INCREASE 
PUBLIC SAFETY 
Looking at the statutory history and underlying premise of 
NICS—to increase information sharing, in seeming contradiction to 
the privacy concerns underlying the HIPAA Privacy Rule—sheds 
light on whether a conflict exists between the two statutory 
provisions. Section A details the history of the Gun Control Act. 
Section B examines the history of the Brady Act and the NICS 
provision specifically. Finally, Section C provides an overview of the 
NIAA. 
A. The Gun Control Act of 1968 
The Gun Control Act is the federal gun-control statute from 
which the Brady Act41 and the NICS provision42 of the Brady Act 
developed. To understand current concerns relating to HIPAA and 
NICS, it is imperative to look at the origins and evolution of federal 
gun-control measures, including the Gun Control Act, the Brady Act, 
NICS, and the NIAA.43 
Before the 1930s, state and local governments were the primary 
regulators of firearms.44 In 1934, however, Congress passed the first 
federal gun-control act, the National Firearms Act of 1934, as part of 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “New Deal for Crime.”45 Since the 
 
 41. Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–924 (2012)). 
 42. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2012) (establishing the NICS requirement); 28 C.F.R. § 25.1–11 (2009) 
(outlining the purpose, definitions, and process of NICS). 
 43. NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-180, 121 Stat. 2559 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922 note (2012)). 
 44. ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN 
AMERICA 187 (2011) (noting that from the Revolutionary period to the 1930s, states and 
municipalities controlled firearm regulation, and that gun control only became a “federal issue 
in the 1930s because President Franklin Delano Roosevelt . . . had a crime problem”).  
 45. History of Gun-Control Legislation, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2012, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/national/history-of-gun-control-legislation/2012/12/22/80c8d624-4ad3-
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passage of the National Firearms Act, Congress has similarly tended 
to enact gun-control laws in the wake of tragic and nation-shaking 
events involving firearms or threats of violence.46 In fact, the next 
major piece of gun-control legislation, the Gun Control Act, was 
passed in 1968 following the assassinations of Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr. and Senator Robert F. Kennedy.47 “As enacted, the Gun 
Control Act . . . banned the interstate shipment of firearms (handguns 
and long guns) and ammunition to private individuals.”48 The Gun 
Control Act also excludes certain at-risk groups from owning guns, 
and prohibits the transfer of guns from federally licensed dealers to 
individuals of such groups.49 One group specifically excluded is those 
with serious mental health conditions. The Gun Control Act contains 
two measures to achieve these exclusionary and prohibitory 
objectives that are specific to this group: it prohibits the sale of 
firearms to anyone “adjudicated as a mental defective” or 
“committed to any mental institution,” and it prohibits the possession 
of firearms by such individuals.50 
Although the Gun Control Act represented a significant advance 
in federal gun-regulation efforts, it provided no means to enforce 
these prohibitions on the sale and possession of firearms—a dealer 
generally had no reason to question a purchaser’s claim of eligibility 
to purchase a gun.51 It was also unclear to many federal and state 
courts as well as health providers what Congress meant by the terms 
“adjudicated as a mental defective” and “committed to any mental 
 
11e2-9a42-d1ce6d0ed278_story.html. President Roosevelt’s “New Deal for Crime” was 
“[s]purred by the bloody ‘Tommy gun’ era . . . [of] Al Capone, John Dillinger, Baby Face 
Nelson, Pretty Boy Floyd, and Bonnie and Clyde.” Id. 
 46. Jana R. McCreary, “Mentally Defective” Language in the Gun Control Act, 45 CONN. L. 
REV. 813, 831 (2013). For an interesting analysis of the parallel relationship between horrific 
acts of gun violence and federal gun-control legislation, see generally Josh Blackmun, The 
Shooting Cycle, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1513 (2014). 
 47. McCreary, supra note 46, at 832. 
 48. ROBERT J. SPITZER, THE POLITICS OF GUN CONTROL 115 (3d ed. 2004). 
 49. McCreary, supra note 46, at 832. 
 50. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4), (g)(4) (2012). It “shall be unlawful for any person to sell” or give 
a firearm to anyone the seller knows, or has reasonable cause to know, “has been adjudicated as 
a mental defective or has been committed to any mental institution.” Id. Further, any person 
“who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental 
institution” shall not “ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or 
affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or . . . receive any firearm or ammunition 
which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” Id. § 922(g)(4).  
 51. McCreary, supra note 46, at 833 (citing Franklin E. Zimring, Firearms and Federal Law: 
The Gun Control Act of 1968, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 133, 152–53 (1975)).  
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institution.”52 Frustrated by the Gun Control Act’s relatively narrow 
scope,53 proponents of gun control sought to strengthen the Act 
through additional legislation.54 
B. The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act and NICS 
The Brady Act was passed by Congress in response to this gun-
control advocacy.55 The Brady Act mandated that the Attorney 
General establish a computerized databank with information 
regarding an individual’s eligibility to purchase a gun.56 The databank 
would automatically search for prohibitory information whenever an 
individual sought to obtain firearms from a federal firearms licensee 
(FFL).57 Under the Brady Act, FFLs were obligated to request a 
background check on the prospective purchaser through this 
computerized system, known as NICS, and determine whether the 
firearm transfer would violate federal or state law.58 
During a NICS check, the purchaser is required by law to 
complete and sign the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 
 
 52. See id. at 844–52, 854 (discussing state and federal courts’ and mental-health 
professionals’ confusion surrounding the definitions of “mentally defective” and “committed to 
a mental institution”); see also Tom Wiehl, The Presumption of Dangerousness: How New 
York’s SAFE Act Reflects Our Irrational Fear of Mental Illness, 38 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 35, 62 
(2014) (noting the ability of courts and legislatures to “manipulat[e] their definitions of mental 
illness as liberally or conservatively as they wish”). 
 53. SPITZER, supra note 48, at 116. “[T]he Gun Control Act was the most sweeping federal 
gun regulation enacted up to that time. Yet its scope”—regulating only gun imports but not the 
importation of gun parts—“was modest, and as a consequence, its impact was minimal.” Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-159, §§ 101–106, 107 
Stat. 1536, 1536–44 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–925A (2012)); 42 U.S.C. § 3759 
(2012)). The Brady Act was passed after a mentally unstable man attempted to assassinate 
President Ronald Reagan. MAYORS AGAINST ILLEGAL GUNS, supra note 19, at 6. 
 56. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(1) (noting that the “Attorney General notifies licensees . . . that 
the national instant criminal background check system is established,” implying that it is the 
Attorney General’s responsibility to ensure NICS’s establishment); EDWARD C. LIU, ERIN 
BAGALMAN, VIVIAN S. CHU & C. STEPHEN REDHEAD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SUBMISSION 
OF MENTAL HEALTH RECORDS TO NICS AND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 5 (2013). 
 57. See sources cited supra note 56. The lawful selling of firearms is limited almost entirely 
to FFLs by the Gun Control Act’s licensing provision. See 18 U.S.C. § 923(a) (“No person shall 
engage in the business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms, or importing or 
manufacturing ammunition, until he has filed an application with and received a license to do so 
from the Attorney General.”). However, there is an exception for persons making “occasional 
sales” or “sell[ing] all or part of his personal collection.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(21)(C); see generally 
Andrew Goddard, A View Through the Gun Show Loophole, 12 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 357 
(2009) (explaining the reasoning for this exception). 
 58. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 19, at 4–5. 
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Explosives (ATF) Form 4473.59 The information on this form is coded 
as data60 and passed through three national databases—the National 
Crime Information Center (NCIC),61 the Interstate Identification 
Index (III),62 and the NICS Index.63 “The NICS Index contains 
information [that] may not be available in the NCIC or the III,” such 
as disqualifying prohibitors based on federal or state law, including 
the mental-health prohibitor.64 Importantly, the mental-health records 
reported to NICS “include only individual identifiers and no actual 
medical information.”65 
A valid match of a potential firearm purchaser with a NICS 
Index record “results in an immediate determination of firearm 
disqualification.”66 Conversely, if the NICS Index search does not 
match any records, the FFL can proceed with the transfer of the 
firearm.67 With a potential match, personnel from the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation’s (FBI’s) NICS section investigate the case by 
reaching out to judicial or law-enforcement agencies for information 
as to whether the firearm purchase should be permitted.68 If the FFL 
does not receive sufficient information from the FBI to make a 
decision within three business days of initiating the background 
 
 59. See 27 C.F.R. § 478.124 (2014) (outlining the use of ATF Form 4473 in the NICS 
process). 
 60. Firearms Transaction Record Part I—Over-the-Counter, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES (Apr. 2012), available at 
http://www.atf.gov/files/forms/download/atf-f-4473-1.pdf. ATF Form 4473 requires basic 
demographic information and also asks specific questions pertaining to the mental-health 
prohibitors, including the following: “[h]ave you ever been adjudicated mentally defective 
(which includes a determination by a court, board, commission, or other lawful authority that you 
are a danger to yourself or to others or are incompetent to manage your own affairs) OR have 
you ever been committed to a mental institution.” Id. 
 61. National Instant Criminal Background Check System: NICS Overview, FED. BUREAU 
INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/nics/general-information/nics-overview (last 
updated Dec. 26, 2013). This database contains information on state, federal, and international 
wanted persons and protection orders. Id. 
 62. Id. This database contains state-reported criminal-history records and may include 
mental-health prohibitors if the individual was found not guilty by reason of insanity or 
incompetence to stand trial. Id.; see Crime Identification Technology Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 
105-251, 112 Stat. 1870 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101, 5119a–5119b, 14601–14616) (describing 
the III system). 
 63. National Instant Criminal Background Check System: NICS Overview, supra note 61. 
 64. Id. 
 65. LIU ET AL., supra note 56, at 7 (emphasis added). 
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
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check, the Brady Act gives the FFL the option of deciding whether or 
not to transfer the firearm, subject to any state-law limitations.69 The 
entire NICS process generally takes place within minutes, and often 
within seconds.70 Importantly, the FFL does not receive any 
information as to which prohibitor is responsible for a “deny” or 
“hold” decision.71 
C. NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 
Following the tragic Virginia Tech shootings,72 Congress passed 
the NIAA, which requires “executive departments and 
agencies . . . [to] provide relevant information, including criminal 
history records, certain adjudications related to the mental health of a 
person, and other information, to databases accessible by the NICS.”73 
In particular, the NIAA seeks to increase the amount of probative 
mental-health data to more effectively “keep guns out of the hands of 
persons prohibited by federal or state law from receiving or 
possessing firearms.”74 To achieve this aim, the NIAA mandates the 
Attorney General to 
make grants to each State, consistent with State plans for the 
integration, automation, and accessibility of criminal history records, 
for use by the State court system to improve the automation and 
transmittal of criminal history dispositions, records relevant to 
determining whether a person has been convicted of a 
misdemeanor . . . and mental health adjudications or commitments.75 
 
 69. 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(1)(B)(ii) (2012); National Instant Criminal Background Check 
System: Fact Sheet, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/nics/
general-information/fact-sheet (last visited Nov. 18, 2014). 
 70. National Instant Criminal Background Check System: NICS Overview, supra note 61. 
 71. HIPAA Privacy Rule and the National Instant Criminal Background Check System 
(NICS), 78 Fed. Reg. 23,872, 23,874 (proposed Apr. 23, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 
160, 164).  
 72. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 73. Presidential Memorandum, Improving Availability of Relevant Executive Branch 
Records to the National Instant Criminal Background Check System, 78 Fed. Reg. 4297, 4297 
(Jan. 22, 2013). 
 74. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB NO. 1121-
0329, FY 2013 NICS ACT RECORD IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM (NARIP) 4 (2013), available at 
http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/narip13_sol.pdf. 
 75. NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-180, 121 Stat. 2559, 
2571 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922 note (2012)) (describing the authorization of 
grants). 
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The NIAA established the NICS Act Record Improvement 
Program (NARIP) to grant money to states to improve the reporting 
of mental-health records, to set record-completion goals, and to 
prescribe grant penalties76 for failure to meet these goals.77 NARIP 
grants are specifically aimed at aiding the “completeness, automation, 
and transmittal of records used during NICS background checks.”78 
From its inception until the end of December 2013, NARIP has 
awarded about $60 million in grants to twenty-two states.79 
Qualifying80 states have used NARIP grants to create or enhance 
database records that track which individuals have been disqualified 
from gun ownership due to mental-health reasons.81 Due in part to the 
 
 76. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 74, at 7.  
[T]he Act provides for discretionary and mandatory . . . funding penalties unless the 
penalties are waived by the Attorney General for good cause. The penalties are 
specified in relation to meeting record completeness requirements and the time 
lapsed from January 8, 2008, when NIAA was enacted. . . . In 2013, 4 percent may be 
withheld if records are less than 70 percent complete. In 2018, 5 percent shall be 
withheld if the records are less than 90 percent complete, unless the Attorney 
General waives the penalty upon a finding that a State is making a reasonable effort 
to comply with the NIAA.  
Id. “Record completeness” refers to the NIAA’s goal of amassing all NICS-applicable records. 
Id. at 6–7.  
 77. Id. at 4.  
 78. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 19, at 15. 
 79. State Profiles: NICS Act Record Improvement Program (NARIP) Awards FY 2009–
2013, BUREAU JUST. STAT., http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=491#funding (last 
modified Sept. 13, 2010). The twenty-two states that have received NARIP grant awards include 
New York in 2009, 2010, and 2011; Oregon in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2013; Florida, Idaho, and 
Texas in 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013; Arizona in 2011, 2012, and 2013; Connecticut, Kentucky, 
and North Dakota in 2011 and 2012; Illinois in 2010, 2012, and 2013; Nevada in 2009 and 2013; 
New Jersey and Wisconsin in 2010 and 2011; Indiana, Missouri, Nebraska, and West Virginia in 
2012 and 2013; Virginia in 2011; and Louisiana, Maryland, and Utah in 2013. Id. 
 80. To qualify for these grants, states must satisfy two conditions. NICS Improvement 
Amendments Act of 2007 (NIAA), Pub. L. No. 110-180 § 2, 121 Stat. 2559 (codified as amended 
at 18 U.S.C. § 922 note (2012)). First, they must give the Attorney General a “reasonable 
estimate . . . of the number of the records subject to the NIAA completeness requirements.” 
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 74, at 4. Second, states must allow individuals to 
contest denials of permission to purchase a firearm on account of having been “adjudicated as a 
mental defective or committed to a mental institution.” Id. 
 81. See Jenny Wilson, State Announces Initiative to Improve Mental Health Reporting to 
NICS, HARTFORD COURANT, May 8, 2013, http://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-guns-
mental-health-reporting-20130507,0,4262201.story. Using federal grant money, Connecticut is 
assembling “a database of individuals who are disqualified from owning a gun for mental health 
reasons” as “part of a nationwide effort to strengthen the federal background check system by 
improving state reporting.” Id. Illinois passed a similar law that went into effect in June 2013, 
requiring “private sellers to process transactions—whether online or in-person—through a 
licensed dealer or law enforcement agency so that the background check takes place before the 
sale.” Mark Guarino, Gun Control: Illinois Law Requiring Background Checks Among ‘Most 
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NARIP grants, many states have passed laws either authorizing or 
requiring submission of mental-health records to NICS, but some 
states have faltered in passing NICS-reporting laws.82 More 
problematically, states remain confused as to their responsibilities in 
supporting the federal aim of prohibiting firearm possession by the 
mentally disabled.83 These issues will be addressed in the following 
Part. 
II.  THE ROLE OF THE STATES AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN 
NICS REPORTING 
In light of the history and development of NICS, this Part 
reviews the roles of the states and the federal government in defining 
the boundaries of NICS reporting. Section A assesses the impact of 
the Printz v. United States84 decision on the federal government’s 
ability to enforce the states’ compliance with federal NICS-reporting 
requirements. Section B considers how, in the wake of Printz, actions 
by the federal government and the judiciary—including by the ATF, 
the Supreme Court, and various circuit courts—have failed to 
establish uniformly the federal requirements states must follow when 
submitting mental-health records to NICS. This Part concludes that 
states’ failure to submit appropriate mental-health information to 
NICS is not due to a barrier within the HIPAA Privacy Rule, but is 
rather a result of states’ confusion—stemming from the imprecision 
and vagueness of the federal judiciary, HHS, and ATF—as to what 
information can be shared. 
 
Stringent,’ CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/
2013/0819/Gun-control-Illinois-law-requiring-background-checks-among-most-stringent. 
Colorado also passed a statute in 2013 expanding required background checks to encompass 
individuals purchasing firearms from a private seller. Background Checks Kept 72 Criminals 
from Buying a Gun in Colorado, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 12, 2013, 2:33 PM, updated Jan. 23, 
2014 1:38 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/12/colorado-background-check-law-
private-sale_n_4428828.html. See infra Part V.A. for further analysis of the laws passed by New 
York, Connecticut, and Virginia since 2007. 
 82. LIU ET AL., supra note 56, at 7–8. 
 83. See MAYORS AGAINST ILLEGAL GUNS, supra note 19, at 15 (explaining that despite 
many states’ passage of laws requiring the submission of mental-health records to NICS, the 
varied state interpretations of federal law and the requirements of states’ record-sharing statutes 
might undermine the success of NICS); see also Michael Luo & Mike McIntire, When Right to 
Bear Arms Includes the Mentally Ill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2013, at A1 (profiling the legal 
ambiguities that law-enforcement officials face when dealing with “mentally unstable people 
with guns”). 
 84. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
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A. The Impact of the Printz Decision on States’ Federal NICS-
Reporting Requirements 
Originally, the Brady Act commanded the “chief law 
enforcement officer” (CLEO) of each local jurisdiction to ensure the 
performance of NICS background checks for every firearms 
purchase.85 But in Printz v. United States, the Supreme Court found 
this enforcement measure to be unconstitutional commandeering by 
which the federal government compels the states “to implement, by 
legislation or executive action, federal regulatory programs.”86 The 
Court based this anticomandeering principle on the federalism 
concept of “dual sovereignty,”87 which recognizes that the “separation 
of the two spheres”—state and federal—“is one of the Constitution’s 
structural protections of liberty” akin to that of the separation of 
powers within the three branches of the federal government.88 The 
majority avoided considering the extent to which the federal 
government can influence states’ compliance with federal regulations 
through conditional funding and taxing schemes,89 but held that the 
 
 85. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2) (1996) (outlining the federal NICS-enforcement duties of 
CLEOs).  
 86. Printz, 521 U.S. at 925. 
 87. Id. at 918–19 (explaining that “[a]lthough the States surrendered many of their powers 
to the new federal government, they retained ‘a residuary and inviolable sovereignty’” (quoting 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898))). 
 88. Id. at 921. 
 89. Id. at 917–18. But see id. at 960 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Congress may require the 
States to implement its programs as a condition of federal spending . . . .”); New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144, 167, 171 (1992) (holding that the Secretary of Energy’s collection of a 
percentage of the surcharge is “no more than a federal tax on interstate commerce,” and that 
under the Spending Clause, “‘Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal 
funds’” as long as “such conditions . . . bear some relationship to the purpose of the federal 
spending” (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206–08 (1987))). In support of 
Congress’s power to influence state compliance through federal spending and taxing schemes, 
the Constitution states that “[t]he Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, 
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general 
Welfare of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Over time, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that this power includes the ability to place conditions on grants to state and local 
governments to influence states’ actions. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 
2566, 2579, 2584 (2012) (noting that Congress’s ability to “tax and spend” gives the federal 
government “considerable influence even in areas where it cannot directly regulate” and allows 
it to “offer funds to the States and . . . condition [them] on compliance with specified 
conditions”); Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004) (holding that the Spending Clause 
gives Congress broad power to appropriate federal money to promote the general welfare); 
Dole, 483 U.S. at 206 (holding that Congress can place conditions on grants to state and local 
governments to shape state action, provided that the conditions are unambiguous, insufficiently 
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federal government cannot “commandeer[]” states through mandates 
that force them to participate in the administration of a federal 
program.90 Under this interpretation, the Brady Act’s provisions 
outlining CLEOs’ responsibilities and mandating states’ participation 
in the Brady Act and NICS reporting were found to be 
unconstitutional.91 
The Printz decision posed two challenges to the implementation 
and success of the Brady Act and the NICS provision. First, although 
the Court did not strike down the Brady Act completely, it suggested 
that Congress might be able to enforce the NICS provision through 
monetary incentives such as conditional grants.92 Printz also implicitly 
recognized that states could independently determine whether they 
wanted to participate in NICS and allowed states to provide 
prohibitor information in excess of that required by the federal 
government.93 
B. States’ Confusion About Federal NICS Requirements 
After the Printz decision, states had to decide whether to engage 
in NICS reporting, including the reporting of information relating to 
the mental-health prohibitor. Once they decided to participate in 
NICS, however, states found themselves more or less in the dark for 
two reasons. First, Congress provided minimal guidance regarding the 
scope of the definitions of “mental defective” and “committed.”94 
 
coercive, not otherwise unconstitutional, and beneficial to the general welfare and a particular 
federal interest). 
 90. Printz, 521 U.S. at 925. “Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a 
federal regulatory program,” and furthermore, “cannot circumvent that prohibition by 
conscripting the States’ officers directly.” Id. at 935.  
 91. Id. The Court also noted that the Brady Act provisions outlining CLEOs’ 
responsibilities and mandating states’ participation in the Brady Act and NICS reporting were 
unconstitutional as a matter of separation of powers between the three branches of the federal 
government. Id. at 922. 
 92. Id. at 917–18. For a discussion of NARIP grants, see supra notes 75–81. 
 93. Printz, 521 U.S. at 917–18, 925–28. The Court’s holding in Printz that “the Federal 
Government may not compel the States to implement . . . regulatory programs,” the Court’s 
recognition of Congress’s power to condition the grant of federal funding on statutory 
adherence, and its discussion of states’ discretion in policymaking, imply that while the state 
cannot be forced to adhere to a federal law, it may determine that it is in its best interests to 
follow the law. Id. at 925, 935. 
 94. See United States v. Hansel, 474 F.2d 1120, 1123 (8th Cir. 1973) (noting that Congress 
did not offer any “revealing guides” to define “mental defective” in the Gun Control Act). For a 
discussion of the ambiguity regarding the definition of “committed” among federal courts 
interpreting state laws, see infra notes 107–19 and accompanying text. 
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And second, Congress failed to consider whether the admissibility of 
information relating to the mental-health prohibitor differed based on 
whether the information originated or was maintained in a hospital or 
judicial setting.95 
Furthermore, although the Supreme Court had the opportunity 
to clarify this critical language from the Brady Act in a few early 
cases,96 the Court merely restated Congress’s intent to keep “lethal 
weapons out of the hands of criminals, drug addicts, mentally 
disordered persons, juveniles, and other persons whose possession of 
them is too high a price in danger to us all to allow”97—in other 
words, those “classified as potentially irresponsible and dangerous.”98 
The Court has not specifically analyzed the meanings of “mentally 
defective” and “committed” for purposes of gun-purchase 
prohibitions99—this definitional work has been undertaken by the 
ATF and the circuit courts. 
 
 95. See Lewis, supra note 17, at 155–57 (discussing differing federal courts of appeals’ 
holdings on whether a commitment order’s permissibility depends on where the order 
originates); McCreary, supra note 46, at 851 (discussing cases in which the admissibility of 
information to NICS depended on whether there was a “formal judicial process”). 
 96. Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 214–16 (1976); Huddleston v. United States, 415 
U.S. 814, 825 (1974). 
 97. Huddleston, 415 U.S. at 825 (identifying which individuals Congress intended to 
disqualify from possessing or purchasing firearms (quoting 114 CONG. REC. 13,219 (1968) 
(statement of Sen. Tydings))). 
 98. Barrett, 423 U.S. at 218. 
 99. In Huddleston v. United States, the petitioner lied on his gun-purchase application at a 
pawnshop, stating that he had not been “convicted in any court of a crime punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 415 U.S. at 816–17. The petitioner argued that 
“acquisition,” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 922(a), did not include the temporary “bailment of personal 
property” that occurs in pawnshop transactions. Id. at 819–20. The Court noted that “‘[t]here is 
no indication in either the committee reports or in the congressional debates that the scope of 
the statute was to be in any way restricted.’” Id. at 825 (citing S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 115 
(1968)). As the Court in Huddleston noted, there was “no doubt of Congress’ intention to 
deprive the juvenile, the mentally incompetent, the criminal, and the fugitive of the use of 
firearms,” Huddleston, 415 U.S. at 827, but in areas in which Congress’s intent was not 
specifically enumerated, the Court “[would] not blindly incant the rule of lenity to destroy the 
spirit and force of the law which the legislature intended to [and did] enact,” id. at 833 (citations 
omitted). In Barrett v. United States, the Supreme Court parroted back Congress’s intent in 
passing the Gun Control Act to “keep[] firearms out of the hands of categories of potentially 
irresponsible persons” and to broadly “make it possible to keep firearms out of the hands of 
those not legally entitled to possess them because of age, criminal background, or 
incompetency.” Barrett, 423 U.S. at 220 (quoting S. REP. NO. 90-1501, at 22 (1968)). Rather than 
clarify who would be considered “potentially irresponsible persons,” the Court held that the 
language of the Gun Control Act was purposefully “broad” but also “unambiguous”—Congress 
had intended to “‘maximize the possibility of keeping firearms out of the hands of such 
persons.’” Id. at 220–21 (citing Huddleston, 415 U.S. at 828). 
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1. The ATF’s Regulations.  The ATF defines “adjudicated as a 
mental defective” to include findings of mental illness by “a court, 
board, commission, or other lawful authority.”100 A recently passed 
ATF rule amends this definition to clarify that individuals found “not 
guilty by reason of mental disease or defect are [also] included in the 
definition.”101 Further, a presiding official in an adjudication must find 
the individual not only to be mentally incompetent or to have a 
mental illness, but also to pose a danger to himself or others, or be 
incapable of managing his own affairs.102 
The term “committed to a mental institution”103 is perhaps even 
less clear than “adjudicated as a mental defective.” The ATF defines 
a “commitment,” for the purposes of “committed to a mental 
institution,” as a “formal commitment . . . to a mental institution by a 
court, board, commission, or other lawful authority,” which, 
depending on the state, might include admitting physicians or 
psychiatrists.104 
Under federal law, “committed to a mental institution” includes 
only involuntary commitments, including those for mental 
defectiveness, mental illness, or drug use, but it “does not include a 
person in a mental institution for observation or a voluntary 
 
 100. 27 C.F.R. § 478.11(a) (2014).  
 101. Amended Definition of “Adjudicated as a Mental Defective” and “Committed to a 
Mental Institution,” 79 Fed. Reg. 774, 775 (proposed Jan. 7, 2014) (amending 27 C.F.R. 
§ 478.11).  
 102. See United States v. Vertz, 102 F. Supp. 2d 787, 788 (W.D. Mich. 2000) (finding that 
although the defendant had received court-ordered treatment, the process by which he was 
committed did not count as an “adjudication” under the Gun Control Act because there was no 
determination that the defendant was a danger to himself or others or was incapable of 
managing his own affairs). A judge’s determination of “dangerousness,” however, might involve 
issues that would be better tackled by a psychologist. See generally Harris, supra note 28 
(describing the various concerns courts face when determining whether an individual is a danger 
to himself or others). 
 103. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4), (g)(4) (2012). 
 104. 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2014). For example, under Michigan law, “a person may be 
involuntarily hospitalized upon the filing of a petition and a physician’s or licensed 
psychologist’s clinical certificate,” but his hospitalization continues only if a different 
psychiatrist examines the patient twenty-four hours later and certifies that the patient needs 
treatment, “pending court hearings.” Vertz, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 791 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. §§ 330.1423, 330.1430 (West 1999)). Under Louisiana law, “The physician’s emergency 
certificate provides legal authority to transport a patient to a legal treatment facility and shall 
permit the director of such treatment facility to detain the patient,” but the certificate also 
stipulates that “[w]ithin 72 hours of this initial admission . . . a second examination by the 
coroner is a ‘necessary precondition to a person’s continued confinement.’” United States v. 
Giardina, 861 F.2d 1334, 1336 (5th Cir. 1988) (quotation mark omitted) (citing LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 28:53(F), (G)(2) (2011 & Supp. 2014)).  
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admission.”105 The new ATF rule amends the definition of 
“committed to a mental institution” to clarify that involuntary 
commitment includes both inpatient and outpatient treatment.106 
Although this new rule will help clarify some of the existing confusion 
surrounding the definition of this key term, questions will likely 
remain. For example, jurisdictions may disagree about the required 
process for an involuntary commitment, as well as who can serve as 
the “lawful authority” under these federal guidelines. 
2. Circuit Courts’ Efforts to Define Gun-Control Language.  Like 
the ATF, several circuit courts have labored to define the meanings of 
the Gun Control Act’s mental-health provisions. The Fourth Circuit’s 
decision in United States v. Midgett107 suggested that under federal law, 
a “commitment” does not require a formal procedure such as a full-
blown adversary hearing; a bench hearing to determine an 
individual’s mental state and a subsequent commitment order are 
sufficient to define someone as “committed.”108 In support of its 
holding, the Fourth Circuit noted that “[s]everal of [its] sister circuits 
[had] reached similar conclusions in interpreting the meaning of 
‘committed’” under § 922(g)(4) of the Gun Control Act.109 The 
Maryland Court of Special Appeals—although not a federal court—
distinguished its facts from those in Midgett, finding that a 
“commitment” had not occurred because the procedures were not 
 
 105. 27 C.F.R. § 478.11. 
 106. Amended Definition of “Adjudicated as a Mental Defective” and “Committed to a 
Mental Institution,” 79 Fed. Reg. at 775. 
 107. United States v. Midgett, 198 F.3d 143 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 108. Id. at 145–46 (holding that Midgett was “committed to a mental institution” pursuant to 
§ 922(g)(4) of the Gun Control Act because he was legally committed by a judge after an 
adjudicatory hearing that determined his competency to stand trial, and concluding that this 
process was sufficiently formal). 
 109. Id. at 146. The court in Midgett agreed with the argument in United States v. 
Chamberlain, 159 F.3d 656 (1st Cir. 1998), that a person can be “committed” under the Gun 
Control Act even if the commitment hearing does not include the “provision of counsel, a full-
blown adversary hearing, a finding by clear and convincing evidence that the person suffers 
from a mental illness, and a judicial order of commitment,” id. at 663, as listed under Maine’s 
Involuntary Hospitalization law, 34−B M.R.S.A. § 3864. Midgett, 198 F.3d at 146–47; see also 
United States v. Whiton, 48 F.3d 356, 358 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that a hearing in which a 
state-court judge found the defendant mentally ill and issued an oral order for his commitment 
for temporary mental-health services constituted a commitment). But see United States v. 
Waters, 23 F.3d 29, 36 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that the defendant was “committed” within the 
meaning of the Gun Control Act without a formal commitment process or judicial order). 
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sufficiently formal to warrant an involuntary commitment.110 The case 
was remanded to the Circuit Court of Montgomery County for 
further proceedings.111 
The Second Circuit’s commitment requirements seem even less 
formal than those addressed by the Fourth Circuit in Midgett. The 
Second Circuit has held that under New York law, an involuntary 
hospitalization of the defendant based on two physicians’ certificates 
was a “commit[ment] to a mental institution” within the meaning of 
the Gun Control Act,112 and that a formal, adversarial adjudication or 
judicial determination to establish a commitment was not necessary.113 
The First Circuit initially followed the approach of the Fourth 
and Second Circuits.114 The First Circuit held that an involuntary 
commitment on an emergency basis without a commitment hearing 
was sufficient to qualify as an involuntary admission within the 
meaning of the Gun Control Act.115 As the court further explained, 
Congress “deemed the potential for misuse of firearms or violence 
sufficient to bring various categories of individuals within the firearms 
ban,” such that “a full-scale adversary proceeding and a 
finding . . . that a person is mentally ill and poses a likelihood of harm 
 
 110. Furda v. State, 997 A.2d 856, 881–82 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (comparing Midgett, in 
which there were more formal proceedings, and noting that Furda was not given an attorney, 
afforded a hearing or factual findings, or detained pursuant to a judicial or administrative 
order). The court heard the appellant’s appeal after the Fourth Circuit had concluded that the 
appellant was prohibited from possessing firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) because the 
appellant had previously been involuntarily committed to a mental institution. Midgett, 198 F.3d 
at 860. The Court of Special Appeals analyzed “whether an involuntary hospital admission 
under Maryland law, for the purpose of an emergency mental-health evaluation, constitutes a 
‘commitment’ under federal law, so as to bar the admittee’s right to possess a regulated firearm 
in Maryland.” Id. at 859. Because the court chose not to follow the Fourth Circuit’s holding, its 
decision is arguably precedent, at least in Maryland. 
 111. Id. at 888. 
 112. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4). 
 113. United States v. Waters, 23 F.3d 29, 34–35 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that under New York 
law, a “commitment” did not require a judicial determination that the defendant was 
“committed” pursuant to New York’s required procedures, and that New York’s system of 
involuntary admission “comports with federal policy”). Contra United States v. Giardina, 861 
F.2d 1334, 1136–37 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that “temporary, emergency detentions for 
treatment of mental disorders or difficulties,” without formal commitments or “formal 
adjudication that a person suffers a mental defect” do not constitute the commitment 
envisioned by 18 U.S.C. § 922); States v. Hansel, 474 F.2d 1120, 1123 (8th Cir. 1973) (holding 
that there was no commitment because the superintendent of the state mental hospital had not 
“determined . . . that the defendant was mentally ill or had conveyed any certification to the 
[Mental Health] Board”). 
 114. United States v. Chamberlain, 159 F.3d 656, 663, 665 (1st Cir. 1998).  
 115. Id.  
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to himself or others before giving effect to the firearms ban would 
undermine Congress’s judgment[.]”116 Despite this language, following 
the District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago117 
decisions, both of which limited federal and state gun-control options, 
the First Circuit reversed course, holding that the Gun Control Act 
“does not bar firearms possession for those who are or were mentally 
ill and dangerous, but (pertinently) only for any person ‘who has been 
adjudicated as a mental defective’ or ‘has been committed to a mental 
institution.’”118 Thus, in the First Circuit, at least, a temporary 
hospitalization does not constitute a “commitment” under the Gun 
Control Act; more process (such as a full, adversarial hearing) is 
required before the state can take away an individual’s right to 
purchase or possess a firearm.119 
The Gun Control Act, including the Brady Act and the NICS 
provision, is itself an arguably vague statute—leaving much flexibility 
as to the federal requirements for mental-health-prohibitor 
information. The confusion as to what should be submitted under the 
federal mental-health prohibitors is not, however, the only problem 
surrounding the submission of mental-health information to NICS. 
There is still the concern that even if the federal government 
specifically defines what is required for these submissions,120 as 
addressed in Part V.B, health-care providers, states, and federal 
courts of appeals must then determine whether such information is 
admissible under HIPAA.121 Before getting to this question, however, 
one must consider whether HIPAA actually impedes the reporting of 
such information in the first place. 
 
 116. Id. at 664. 
 117. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
 118. United States v. Rehlander, 666 F.3d 45, 50 (1st Cir. 2012). The court noted that “in 
section 922, Congress did not prohibit gun possession by those who were or are mentally ill and 
dangerous, and such a free floating prohibition would be very hard to administer, although 
perhaps not impossible.” Id. (emphasis added). The court did not discuss, however, whether 
such a prohibition would be legally feasible in the current, post-Heller environment, nor did it 
suggest any strategies to support this general prohibition against the purchase and possession of 
guns by those who are “mentally ill and dangerous.” Id. at 50–51 (emphasis added). 
 119. Id. at 50.  
 120. The Department of Justice and the ATF released an amendment to this language that 
clarifies some, but not all, of the confusion surrounding the Gun Control Act. Amended 
Definition of “Adjudicated as a Mental Defective” and “Committed to a Mental Institution,” 79 
Fed. Reg. 774, 774 (proposed Jan. 7, 2014) (amending 27 C.F.R. § 478.11). 
 121. State privacy laws may also affect the admissibility of information. The issue of 
admissibility under state privacy laws is not addressed in this Note. 
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III.  AMELIORATING THE “TENSION” BETWEEN 
THE GUN CONTROL ACT AND HIPAA  
Following several atrocious acts of gun violence by individuals 
with mental-health disabilities or disorders,122 governmental and 
nongovernmental organizations have analyzed why states have failed 
to gather and transmit to NICS the mental-health information of 
individuals adjudicated as “mentally defective” or committed to an 
institution.123 Although these critics have pointed to various 
weaknesses in NICS reporting, including states’ “technological 
barriers”124 (such as antiquated electronic-submission systems) and 
their lack of appropriate and necessary reporting infrastructures,125 
some states and policymakers are also concerned that the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule precludes states from submitting mental-health 
information to NICS. In an effort to show that this is not the case, this 
Part first reviews the history of HIPAA and the basic structure and 
privacy protections within the HIPAA Privacy Rule. Next, this Part 
examines the exceptions to the HIPAA Privacy Rule that should 
arguably allow for reporting to NICS. 
A. HIPAA and the HIPAA Privacy Rule 
Perhaps an unexpected bedfellow of the Gun Control Act, the 
Brady Act, and the NICS provision, HIPAA was passed to amend the 
Internal Revenue Code by improving the “portability and continuity 
of health insurance coverage in the group and individual markets.”126 
Its aim was “to combat waste, fraud, and abuse in health insurance 
and health care delivery, to promote the use of medical savings 
accounts, to improve access to long-term care services and coverage, 
to simplify the administration of health insurance, and for other 
purposes.”127 
Although HIPAA did not originally cover health-information 
privacy, the HIPAA Privacy Rule, which HHS published in 2000,128 
 
 122. See supra notes 14–15, 24–25 and accompanying text. 
 123. See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text. 
 124. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 19, at 12. 
 125. MAYORS AGAINST ILLEGAL GUNS, supra note 19, at 22. 
 126. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, 1937 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 
U.S.C. (2012)).  
 127. Id. 
 128. 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462, 82,462 (proposed Dec. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 
160, 164). 
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concerns the privacy of individually identifiable health information.129 
As it currently stands, the HIPAA Privacy Rule applies to “covered 
entities” that transmit health information electronically.130 “Covered 
entities” include health plans,131 health-care clearinghouses,132 and 
health-care providers who transmit health information 
electronically.133 For purposes of HIPAA, protected health 
information (PHI) is any information that independently identifies 
the individual and is “transmitted by electronic media,” “maintained 
in electronic media,” or “transmitted or maintained in any other form 
or medium.”134 PHI, which includes demographic data, can be 
anything that relates to “the individual’s past, present[,] or future 
physical or mental health or condition,” the “provision of health care 
to the individual,” or “the past, present, or future payment for the 
provision of health care to the individual.”135 Thus, while the mental-
health records reported to NICS should not include medical 
 
 129. Id. 
 130. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2014).  
 131. See id. § 160.103 (explaining that a “health plan” may include any individual or group 
plan that provides or pays for medical care, and may encompass both private and government 
plans, specifically health-maintenance organizations (HMOs) and high-risk pools). 
 132. Id. “Health-care clearinghouse” is a term of art under the HIPAA Privacy Rule. It 
refers to an entity (for example, a claims processor) that translates health information received 
from health-care organizations or other HIPAA-covered units either to or from the standard 
format that is required for electronic transactions. Id. 
 133. Id. “Health-care providers” include any person (such as a physician, nurse, or 
pharmacist) or entity (for example, a hospital or clinic) that “furnishes, bills, or is paid for health 
care in the normal course of business.” Id. To be a covered entity, providers must do at least one 
of the following: verify insurance coverage, file a health claim, or transmit health information 
electronically in a standard format required by HIPAA. Beverly Cohen, Reconciling the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule with State Law Regulating Ex Parte Interviews of Plaintiffs’ Treating Physicians: A 
Guide to Performing HIPAA Preemption Analysis, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1091, 1097 (2006) (citing 
42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(a)(2) (2000)). Providers relying on third-party billing services to conduct 
electronic transactions must also comply with the HIPAA Privacy Rule. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103; see 
also OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUMMARY OF THE 
HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 2 (2003) (defining the types of health-care providers that would be 
considered “covered entities” under the HIPAA Privacy Rule). This means that providers who 
do not submit insurance claims electronically are not subject to the rule. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 
(“Certain transmissions, including of paper, via facsimile, and of voice, via telephone, are not 
considered to be transmissions via electronic media . . . .”). 
 134. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. 
 135. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 133, at 4. Examples of PHI include common 
identifiers such as name, address, birth date, and social-security number, but exclude 
“employment records that a covered entity maintains in its capacity as an employer” as well as 
educational and other records “subject to, or defined in, the Family Educational Rights and 
Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g)[ (2012)].” Id.  
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information, but only individual identifiers,136 the information 
reported still may be subject to the HIPAA Privacy Rule if it is 
processed by a covered entity. 
The HIPAA Privacy Rule prohibits a covered entity from using 
or disclosing PHI, except as expressly permitted or required by the 
Rule itself.137 Under the Rule, a covered entity may use or disclose 
PHI for treatment purposes, payment, and general health-care 
operations.138 In addition, the HIPAA Privacy Rule permits disclosure 
of PHI when disclosure is required by state law,139 when disclosure 
supports certain specified law-enforcement purposes,140 when 
disclosure averts a serious threat to health or safety,141 or when 
disclosure is needed for specialized government functions.142 Further, 
as courts and administrative bodies do not generally handle electronic 
PHI, they are not included within the blanket definition of a “covered 
entity,”143 such that the health information produced in the process of 
a judicial or administrative procedure is not considered PHI. 
B. Applicable HIPAA Exceptions to NICS Reporting 
It makes some sense that there is a growing concern among 
lawmakers, politicians, and organizations that HIPAA is partially 
responsible for the failure of states to submit mental-health-
prohibitor information to NICS.144 The two statutes’ philosophies 
seem almost completely opposed: the Gun Control Act and NICS 
stand for disclosure, at least of the information required to ascertain 
whether someone should be prohibited from owning a gun, whereas 
 
 136. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 137. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a) (2014). The two circumstances in which PHI must be disclosed 
are when the individual who is the subject of the information requests his or her medical 
records, and when HHS officials investigating potential HIPAA Privacy Rule violations request 
the information. Id. 
 138. LIU ET AL., supra note 56, at 9.  
 139. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(a). Use or disclosure of PHI by covered entities must also 
“compl[y] with and [be] limited to the relevant requirements of such law.” Id. 
 140. Id. § 164.512(f).  
 141. Id. § 164.512(j). A health-care provider may use or disclose PHI if the provider believes 
in good faith that the use or disclosure “is necessary to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent 
threat to the health or safety of a person or the public.” Id. 
 142. Id. § 164.512(k). These specified essential government functions include military and 
veteran activities, national-security and intelligence activities, protective services for the 
president, and certain law-enforcement-custody situations. Id. 
 143. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2014). 
 144. See supra notes 19–23 and accompanying text. 
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HIPAA stands for protection and nondisclosure (subject to some 
exceptions) of health information.145 Certain HIPAA Privacy Rule 
exceptions to the disclosure of health records, however, undermine 
this assumed conflict, and suggest that HIPAA already allows states 
to submit the necessary information to NICS, either directly or 
through a state records center. 
1. The Judicially Created Records Exception.  As previously 
noted, individuals subject to the federal mental-health prohibitor 
include those who have been involuntarily committed to a mental 
institution, found incompetent to stand trial or not guilty by reason of 
insanity, or otherwise determined through an adjudication to be a 
danger to themselves, a danger to others, or unable to manage their 
own affairs.146 The criminal-justice system generates (and frequently 
maintains) the records of persons adjudicated as guilty by reason of 
insanity or as incompetent to stand trial. Because the HIPAA Privacy 
Rule generally does not apply to records that are created or produced 
in the course of a judicial or administrative procedure,147 such records 
are not covered by HIPAA.148 Similarly, involuntary civil 
commitments and adjudications of an individual’s danger (or his 
ability to manage his own affairs), often occur through a judicial or 
administrative process, and so are not subject to HIPAA 
restrictions.149 
There are instances, however, where involuntary civil 
commitments and adjudication of an individual’s danger or mental 
incompetence are covered by HIPAA. For example, the record of an 
involuntary commitment or mental-health adjudication might have 
initiated with a HIPAA-covered entity. Or, the state repository for 
such records might be a HIPAA-covered entity, in which case 
pertinent prohibitor information would be subject to HIPAA 
protections. Despite these seeming limitations, however, the HIPAA 
 
 145. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (listing the exceptions to nondisclosure of PHI). 
 146. 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2014) (defining the terms “adjudicated as a mental defective” and 
“committed to a mental institution”). 
 147. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 148. HIPAA Privacy Rule and the National Instant Criminal Background Check System 
(NICS), 78 Fed. Reg. 23,872, 23,874 (proposed Apr. 23, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 
160 and 164).  
 149. Id.  
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Privacy Rule may, through exceptions, provide ways for even covered 
entities to report prohibitor information to NICS, as outlined below.150 
2. The Required-Reporting Exception.  The HIPAA Privacy Rule 
allows covered entities to disclose information to NICS if the state 
has a law requiring such reporting.151 There are currently more than 
thirty states with laws that explicitly require NICS reporting.152 
 
 150. Id. at 23,875.  
 151. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(a) (2014).  
 152. These states include Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, 
Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, 
Washington, and Wisconsin. See LIU ET AL., supra note 56, at 11 n.53 (listing twenty-three states 
as requiring NICS reporting). Since the Liu study, many other states have passed legislation 
requiring such reporting. See An Act Relating to reporting on involuntary mental health 
commitment to the National Instant Criminal Background Check System; relating to the sealing 
of records of mental health proceedings; and relating to relief from a disability resulting from an 
involuntary commitment or an adjudication of mental illness or mental incompetence, 2014 
Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 73 (to be codified at ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.907) (requiring reporting of 
an involuntary commitment or finding of mental incompetence); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
609(A) (Supp. 2014) (mandating that effective January 1, 2015, “If a person is found 
incompetent by a court, the court shall transmit the case information . . . to the supreme court. 
The supreme court shall transmit the case information . . . to the department of public safety. 
The department of public safety shall transmit the case information . . . to the [N]ational 
[I]nstant [C]riminal [B]ackground [C]heck [S]ystem”); Mental Health−Gun Control, 2014 Haw. 
Sess. Laws 87 (to be codified at Haw. Rev. Stat. § 134-6.5) (requiring reporting of an involuntary 
commitment or finding of mental incompetence); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-133.2(b) 
(LexisNexis Supp. 2014) (“A court shall promptly report . . . if a court . . . finds that a person is 
not criminally responsible . . . .”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-9-101(2) (West Supp. 2014) (requiring 
the Department of Public Safety to establish a reporting procedure); Preclusions Related to 
Oklahoma Self-Defense Act, 2014 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 259 (West) (to be codified at 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1290.27) (mandating that effective July 1, 2015, “When a court adjudicates 
a person mentally incompetent or orders the involuntary commitment of a person due to a 
mental illness . . . the clerk of the Court shall forward a certified copy of the order or 
adjudication to the Federal Bureau of Investigation or its successor agency for the sole purpose 
of inclusion in the National Instant Criminal Background Check System database” (emphasis 
added)); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-7-48 (Supp. 2014) (“The attorney general shall transmit to 
the National Instant Criminal Background System . . . the name and other identifying 
information of any person who is prohibited from possessing a firearm under 18 U.S.C. 
922(g)(4) because . . . the person was determined to be incompetent to stand trial . . . , or the 
person was involuntarily committed . . . .”). New Jersey passed a bill clarifying that the state is 
required to submit certain mental-health information to NICS. Gen. Assemb. 3717, 2013 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2013). Florida amended its code to require the state’s Department of Law 
Enforcement to “compile and maintain an automated database of persons who are prohibited 
from purchasing a firearm based on court records of adjudications of mental defectiveness or 
commitments to mental institutions.” FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.065(2)(a)4.c. (West 2007 & Supp. 
2013). South Carolina also recently passed a bill, which became effective on August 1, 2013, 
requiring courts to submit records to the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division of persons 
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However, states that permit (but do not require) covered entities to 
disclose records,153 and states without laws requiring the reporting of 
mental-health records to NICS,154 are probably not covered by this 
particular exception to HIPAA.155 For most of these states, however, 
the prohibitor information is unaffected by HIPAA-reporting 
prohibitions because it is created and kept in the judicial system, and 
therefore, HIPAA does not serve as a barrier to mental-health-
prohibitor submission.156 
 
who have “been adjudicated as a mental defective” or who, via court order, have “been 
committed to a mental institution.” H. 3560, 2013 Gen. Assemb., 120th Sess. (S.C. 2013). 
Louisiana enacted legislation that went into effect January 1, 2014, requiring clerks to submit 
records of court orders requiring individuals to be “judicially committed, receive involuntary 
outpatient treatment, or receive mental health treatment or services” as well as the records of 
court determinations “that a person does not have the mental capacity to proceed with a 
criminal trial.” H. 21, 2013 H., Reg. Sess. (La. 2013). 
 153. There are five states that permit, but do not require, reporting to NICS: California, 
Missouri, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia. See LIU ET AL., supra note 56, at 11 n.54 
(listing Missouri, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia); CAL. PENAL CODE § 28220(b) 
(West Supp. 2014) (“[T]he Department of Justice may participate in the National Instant 
Criminal Background Check System . . . .” (emphasis added)). In most of these states, the 
prohibitor information is not PHI, nor is it affected by HIPAA. In Missouri, the mental-health-
prohibitor information comes from court proceedings and “shall be . . . available . . . to the 
Missouri state highway patrol for reporting to the National Instant Criminal Background Check 
System (NICS).” MO. ANN. STAT. § 630.140(5) (West 2014). In Nebraska, court clerks update 
HHS and the Nebraska State Police when individuals have received mental-health-based 
commitment orders by a mental-health board or court. Because they originate with the court 
and are held by the police and health department, the records are likely not PHI. NEB. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 69-2409.01(1) (LexisNexis 2014). In West Virginia, mental-health-prohibitor 
information originates and is held with the circuit courts and is compiled by the court clerks, so 
it is not PHI. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-7A-3(a) (LexisNexis 2010). In Pennsylvania, as well, 
persons who have “been adjudicated as an incompetent” or “involuntarily committed” cannot 
possess a gun. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6105(c)(4) (West 2000 & Supp. 2014). It is not clear 
whether the Pennsylvania commitment records are kept in or originate from a covered entity. 
Since January 2013, however, Pennsylvania has been sending mental-health records to NICS. 
Moriah Balingit, Pa. Sends Mental Health Data for Gun Checks, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE 
(Jan. 19, 2013), http://www.post-gazette.com/news/state/2013/01/19/Pa-sends-mental-health-
data-for-gun-checks/stories/201301190192. There is also a pending rule requiring the disclosure 
of mental-health-prohibitor information. H. 921, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2013) 
(referred to judiciary Mar. 11, 2013).  
 154. These include the District of Columbia and Arkansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming. 
Everytown for Gun Safety, Closing the Gaps: Strengthening the Background Check System To 
Keep Guns Away from the Dangerously Mentally Ill, at 13 (2014), available at 
http://everytown.org/documents/2014/10/closing-the-gaps.pdf. 
 155. Id. at 11–12. 
 156. See supra notes 153–54 and accompanying text. 
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3. The Hybrid-Entity Exception.  Alternatively, if (1) there is no 
state law, or if the existing state law authorizes but does not require 
such disclosure; and (2) the records of an involuntary commitment or 
mental-health adjudication originate with a HIPAA-covered entity, 
or the HIPAA-covered entity is the state repository for such records, 
the HIPAA Privacy Rule permits a covered entity that performs both 
health-care and non-health-care functions (such as NICS reporting) 
to become a hybrid entity such that the HIPAA Privacy Rule applies 
only to its health-care functions.157 A covered entity can achieve 
hybrid status by separating its health-care components from its other 
components, “documenting that designation, and implementing 
policies and procedures to prevent unauthorized access to protected 
health information by the entity’s non-covered components.”158 This 
would allow a covered entity to report prohibitor information 
through its non-HIPAA-covered unit without potentially being 
restricted by the HIPAA Privacy Rule.159 
Although it might seem somewhat complicated to separate a 
NICS-reporting section from other parts of a health-care 
organization, a key requirement of the HIPAA Privacy Rule is that it 
covers PHI electronically created, maintained, or received by an 
entity.160 If the records of “mentally defective” adjudications and 
decisions to commit someone involuntarily are housed separately 
from the day-to-day transactions of a health-care organization, and 
are not transferred electronically, there is no HIPAA Privacy Rule 
violation.161 This “hybrid-entity exception” is a potentially viable 
solution for states that cannot or do not wish to pass mandatory-
reporting laws.162 
 
 157. 45 C.F.R. § 164.103 (2014) (defining a “hybrid entity”); id. § 164.105(a)(2)(D)(ii) (2014) 
(detailing the safeguard requirements for hybrid entities with regard to the health-care and non-
health-care components); see HIPAA Privacy Rule and the National Instant Criminal 
Background Check System (NICS), 78 Fed. Reg. 23,872, 23,875 (proposed Apr. 23, 2013) (to be 
codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 and 164) (summarizing the basic functionality and requirements of 
a hybrid entity and its relation to NICS reporting). 
 158. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule and the 
National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS), 79 Fed. Reg. 784, 787 (proposed 
Jan. 7, 2014). 
 159. HIPAA Privacy Rule and the National Instant Criminal Background Check System 
(NICS), 78 Fed. Reg. at 23,875 (citing 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.103, 164.105 (2014)). 
 160. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. 
 161. See HIPAA Privacy Rule and the National Instant Criminal Background Check System 
(NICS), 78 Fed. Reg. at 23,875 (outlining briefly the hybrid-entity option for states). 
 162. Id. 
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4. The Public-Health Exception.  The public-health exception is 
an additional HIPAA exception for states that do not require the 
submission of records to NICS and whose applicable mental-health 
information is not created and housed within the court system. The 
organic HIPAA statute and the HIPAA Privacy Rule allow covered 
entities to disclose PHI to a public-health authority, or to an agent of 
a public-health authority, when that authority is “authorized by law to 
collect or receive such information for the purpose of preventing or 
controlling disease, injury, or disability.”163 This is perhaps the most 
applicable exception to HIPAA for NICS purposes. If state laws that 
authorize, but do not require, the submission of records to NICS are 
viewed as related to public-health measures, HIPAA’s federal 
preemption of state PHI privacy laws might be negated.164 
Further, although the HIPAA Privacy Rule is fairly narrow as to 
the enumerated exceptions for its preemption of state laws, the 
HIPAA statute is broader and includes not only exceptions to state 
preemption,165 but a rule of construction166 that potentially allows state 
and federal public-health laws to trump state and federal privacy 
laws.167 Thus, a state privacy law that would otherwise be saved from 
preemption by HIPAA’s exception clauses—a stricter privacy law,168 
 
 163. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-7(b) (2012); 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)(i) (2014).  
 164. Barbara J. Evans, Institutional Competence to Balance Privacy and Competing Values: 
The Forgotten Third Prong of HIPAA Preemption Analysis, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1175, 1200 
(2013); see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-496, pt. 1, at 37 (1996) (separating “public health reporting” 
from the “general effect” of the statute on state law, as later adopted in full in the HIPAA 
statute).  
 165. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-7(a)(2)(A). 
 166. See id. § 1320d-7(b) (“Nothing in this part shall be construed to invalidate or limit the 
authority, power, or procedures established under any law providing for the reporting of disease 
or injury, child abuse, birth, or death, public health surveillance, or public health investigation 
or intervention.”). 
 167. See Evans, supra note 164, at 1200 (arguing that Congress’s use of the phrase “any law” 
as opposed to “[s]tate law” in HIPAA provision 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-7, as well as the overall 
structure of the law, indicates that 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-7(b) is not a saving clause, or an exception 
clause, but “a rule of construction that, among other things, limits the reach of the saving 
clauses” when public health is involved). 
 168. For example, the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health is a covered entity (that 
is, not a hybrid) and is subject to all HIPAA constraints. MASS. DEP’T OF MENTAL HEALTH, 
DMH PRIVACY HANDBOOK INTRODUCTION (2014), available at http://www.mass.gov/eohhs/
docs/dmh/hipaa/handbook/aintroduction.pdf. In addition to following the HIPAA 
requirements, the Department is governed by stricter state laws limiting HIPAA exceptions to 
disclosures from a “proper judicial order” that requests disclosure to the “patient, resident, or 
attorney” if it is in the best interest of the patient. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, § 36 (LexisNexis 
Supp. 2014). Although this more stringent state law would normally be an exception to HIPAA, 
a federal or state public-health law may preempt it. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-7(a)(2)(B). 
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for example—might be preempted in the event that the issue 
concerns public health.169 
One major problem with this exception is the potentially vast 
scope of the type of public-health activities that Congress intended 
§ 1320d-7(b) of HIPAA to protect. This concern could be addressed 
by allowing the Secretary of HHS to determine piecemeal whether 
the provision of state law, if normally preemptable by HIPAA, is 
“necessary . . . for other purposes.”170 The Secretary of HHS could 
provide an interpretive rule or policy statement—a nonlegislative 
rule, not subject to the Administrative Procedure Act171—provided 
that the statement does not announce or add substantive content to 
the Privacy Rule and is within a fair reading of the statute’s intent.172 
If the new interpretive rule’s main function is to allow agencies to 
“explain ambiguous terms in legislative enactments without having to 
undertake cumbersome proceedings,” it may be considered an 
interpretive rule or policy statement dictating the extent of a public-
health designation.173 
IV.  THE PROPOSED HIPAA EXCEPTION—A VIABLE SOLUTION? 
In light of the Gun Control Act and the Brady Act’s NICS 
provision, the roles of state and federal governments in defining 
NICS-reporting requirements, and the various HIPAA exceptions 
applicable to states’ NICS reporting, the recently proposed HIPAA 
exception—announced by the HIPAA-NICS NPRM174—seems to 
have been formulated in response to fears that NICS and the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule are in conflict, when in fact, no such conflict exists. 
Nonetheless, might this HIPAA exception in some way help states 
and health-care professionals provide appropriate mental-health 
 
 169. Evans, supra note 164, at 1200–01. 
 170. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-7(a)(2)(A)(i)(IV). 
 171. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2012).  
 172. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (separating cases 
in which an “agency is merely explicating Congress’ desires” from those in which the agency 
adds its own substantive content to the statute).  
 173. See id. at 1045 (explaining that such rules need not go through the process of notice and 
comment); Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and 
the Like—Should Federal Agencies Use Them To Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1313 & 
n.5 (1992) (explaining that an agency may issue a rule or policy statement without notice and 
comment if its interpretation is true to the underlying statute or rule and does not add any legal 
substance).  
 174. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 78 Fed. Reg. 784 (proposed Jan. 7, 2014) (to be 
codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 164). 
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information to NICS? Or, is it unnecessary given the trend in state 
NICS-reporting legislation, and perhaps even deleterious to the 
interests of states? 
This Part first expands upon the discussion in Part III.B.4, 
detailing more fully how the public-health provision of the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule already contains an exception for the submission of 
information pertaining to an individual’s mental-health records. This 
Part then examines how the HIPAA-NICS NPRM is unnecessary, 
and perhaps even harmful, to the goal of increasing the submission of 
records given the trend among states to pass laws requiring NICS 
reporting. It concludes by questioning whether, in addition to 
weakening national gun-control efforts, the HIPAA-NICS NPRM 
might also undermine states’ ability to control what information is 
reported to NICS. 
A. The Existing Public-Health Exception 
As this Note previously outlined, perhaps the strongest legal 
argument against this proposed regulation is that the new exception it 
offers is unnecessary given existing HIPAA exceptions and 
provisions.175 Namely, although the HIPAA Privacy Rule prohibits a 
covered entity from using or disclosing PHI except as expressly 
permitted or required by the HIPAA Privacy Rule,176 there is an 
exception for rules that are related to public-health measures.177 The 
Secretary of HHS could interpret “public health” so as to allow states 
with laws that authorize, but do not require, the submission of 
mental-health-prohibitor information to submit records to NICS if 
the information is covered by HIPAA. The public-health interest 
would be defined as the protection of Americans from unnecessary 
gun violence, and the protection of those who should not be able to 
obtain a gun based on federal standards from their own potentially 
fatal actions.178 
The Supreme Court has recognized a general public-health 
exception to the right of privacy in one’s medical information.179 Over 
 
 175. See supra Part III.B. 
 176. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a) (2013).  
 177. See supra notes 163–69 and accompanying text. 
 178. For a description of the characteristics that make up the mental-health prohibitors, see 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g), (n) (2012); 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2014). 
 179. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 591–603 (1977) (finding that a patient and his 
physician’s rights to privacy were not violated by a New York statute that required health-care 
facilities to report to a centralized computer system the issuance of specific prescription drugs 
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time, other federal courts of appeals have adopted this exception and 
have created a test that weighs various factors, including patient 
privacy and public-health interests, in determining whether a patient’s 
medical records should be disclosed.180 In New York, there has been 
backlash against the use of the HIPAA public-health exception to 
justify the disclosure of the records of individuals with mental 
disabilities.181 The facts of the only New York case to look squarely at 
this issue,182 however, are likely too narrow to apply to the use of the 
public-health exception for NICS reporting.183 
 
(for which there was an illegal market), because sufficient privacy protections were built into 
the computer database and there was a minimal risk to individuals that their identity would be 
exposed).  
 180. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 572, 578 (3d Cir. 1980) 
(noting, in reconciling the privacy interests of the employees of Westinghouse Electric Corp. 
with the “significant public interest in research designed to improve occupational safety and 
health,” that “[g]enerally, the reporting requirements which have been upheld have been those 
in which the government has advanced a need to acquire the information to develop treatment 
programs or control threats to public health”); Patients of Dr. Solomon v. Bd. of Physician 
Quality Assurance, 85 F. Supp. 2d 545, 546, 548 (D. Md. 1999) (denying a “Petition for 
Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction” to enjoin the Board of Physician Quality 
Assurance and the Maryland State Department of Health and Mental Hygiene from seizing Dr. 
Solomon’s medical records until there was a “‘full and fair hearing’ with regard to [the patients’] 
privacy rights,” as “allowing individual patients to block Board investigations . . . would hinder 
the Board’s ability to protect public health”).  
 181. See Miguel M. v. Barron, 950 N.E.2d 107, 109 (N.Y. 2011) (holding that “the Privacy 
Rule adopted by the federal government pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) prohibits the disclosure of a patient’s medical records to a state 
agency that requests them for use in a proceeding to compel the patient to accept mental health 
treatment, where the patient has neither authorized the disclosure nor received notice of the 
agency’s request for the records”). 
 182. In this case, at a hearing to order assisted outpatient treatment (AOT), Dr. Barron 
offered into evidence health records relating to Miguel’s (his patient’s) hospitalizations. Miguel 
had not authorized the release of the records and no court order for their disclosure had been 
sought. Id. Barron argued that the disclosure was acceptable under the public-health exception 
to HIPAA given that the “disclosure of a mentally ill person’s hospital records . . . protect[ed] 
the public health, because mentally ill people might kill or injure other people . . . who, of 
course, are members of the public.” Id. at 110. The court held that this reading of the HIPAA 
public-health exception was too narrow, because the “apparent purpose of the public health 
exception is to facilitate government activities that protect large numbers of people . . . or that 
advance public health by accumulating valuable statistical information.” Id. at 111. 
 183. In Barron, an individual took it upon himself, albeit while working under the purview 
of the state, to disclose the records of an individual to a court without going through the existing 
legal process of obtaining a court order to acquire these records. Id. at 109. Barron offered the 
patient’s entire record—not just his demographic information—and it was used to force the 
patient to accept AOT. Id. By contrast, with NICS reporting, the information remains in a 
central computerized database that is not accessible to the general public. See supra notes 59–69 
and accompanying text. Barron’s argument—that he was protecting public health by preventing 
the potentially dangerous actions of an individual—seems parallel to the public-health reason 
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Moreover, numerous legal scholars have discussed the public-
health exception’s possible use for NICS mental-health reporting,184 
and Leon Rodriguez, the head of the OCR, has specifically suggested 
that if there is a conflict between the HIPAA Privacy Rule and NICS, 
it would be mitigated by this public-health exception.185 To utilize this 
exception, the Secretary of HHS would have to weigh the public-
health aim of reducing gun violence nationally with the competing 
aim of protecting patient privacy, and determine whether there is a 
feasible alternative that states could use—such as the creation of a 
hybrid entity or the passage of a law requiring NICS reporting.186 If 
NICS-reporting procedures ensure that only necessary prohibitor 
information is submitted, and if the creation of a hybrid entity or 
passage of a law requiring NICS submission proves too onerous, the 
public-health interest would likely be deemed weightier. In such a 
case, select mental-health-prohibitor information could be submitted 
to NICS regardless of whether it is required or authorized by state 
law. 
B. A Lack of Necessity for the Proposed Regulation, Its Potential To 
Undermine the Goals of National Gun Control, and Its Possible 
State Sovereignty Problem 
The HIPAA-NICS NPRM is arguably not only unnecessary 
given the existing public-health exception, but unnecessary given the 
reality that states have increasingly passed legislation that requires the 
submission of prohibitor information (including mental-health 
information) to NICS. The HIPAA-NICS exception might also act to 
 
for allowing the exception to NICS. The NICS database, however, is more analogous to a large 
“accumulat[ion] [of] valuable statistical information.” Barron, 950 N.E.2d at 111. The NICS 
database is used by NICS for the broader federal goal of stymying the purchase of firearms by 
individuals who have been deemed incapable for mental-health reasons. Scarborough v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 563, 571 (1977) (“The legislative history [of the Gun Control Act] in its entirety, 
while brief, further supports the view that Congress sought to rule broadly.”). 
 184. See, e.g., Evans, supra note 164, at 1225–26 (noting that the “Privacy Rule’s public 
health exception is widely—and sometimes wildly—misunderstood” and that “[c]onfusion about 
the Privacy Rule continues to thwart access to data for the enumerated public health activities” 
(footnote omitted)); Andrea Wilson, Missing the Mark: The Public Health Exception to the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule and Its Impact on Surveillance Activity, 9 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 
131, 140–41 (2008) (discussing covered entities’ uncertainty as to when it is appropriate under 
the public-health exception to turn over the records of patients and customers).  
 185. Letter from Leon Rodriguez, Dir. Office of Civil Rights, Dep’t of Health and Human 
Servs., to the Nation’s Health Care Providers, supra note 27. 
 186. See supra notes 157–62 and accompanying text. 
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undermine the goal of uniform mental-health submission and to 
undermine states’ control over record submission.  
1. State Trends and the Goal of Uniform Submission. As 
previously mentioned, under Printz, states must opt in to NICS 
participation—and are therefore responsible for formulating laws that 
address NICS reporting as long as they abide by base-level federal 
requirements.187 If one understands the public-health exception as a 
solution to the perceived conflict between NICS and the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule, states should be free to create reporting laws—whether 
mandatory or discretionary—as they see fit. 
Nevertheless, perhaps unaware of the public-health exception’s 
applicability, many states have passed legislation requiring the 
submission of mental-health-prohibitor information. More than thirty 
states now require that federal prohibitor information be submitted 
to NICS, and more states continue to introduce bills requiring such 
disclosure.188 Furthermore, in most, if not all, of the five states that 
authorize but do not require the disclosure of mental-health-
prohibitor information, information relating to mental-health 
adjudications comes from the judicial system and is therefore not 
affected by the HIPAA Privacy Rule restrictions.189 In proposing the 
HIPAA-NICS NPRM, therefore, the federal government appears to 
have rushed to create an exception that is unnecessary given the 
current trend of states to pass their own NICS-reporting 
requirements. 
In light of this trend, only those states without laws requiring the 
reporting of prohibitor information to NICS,190 and whose prohibitor 
information is classified as PHI,191 would be affected by the new 
HIPAA-NICS NPRM exception. However, these states should be 
encouraged to follow the trend of their sister states—passing laws 
requiring submission—as the increase in NICS records resulting from 
such laws will improve the overall success of the NICS program. The 
HIPAA-NICS NPRM will likely undermine this trend, however, as 
the creation of a HIPAA exception—as dictated by the NPRM—
 
 187. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 188. See supra note 152. 
 189. See supra note 153.  
 190. See supra note 154. 
 191. See supra Part III.B. 
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allowing any type of reporting legislation, discretionary or required, 
may encourage lax and disparate reporting laws across the states. 
It might be argued that such federal encouragement of required-
reporting legislation in place of a blanket HIPAA-NICS exception is 
contrary to the holding in Printz v. United States.192 However, states 
would not be forced to report prohibitor information to NICS. 
Rather, the federal government might be able to require a state—as a 
necessary condition of enrollment in the NICS program—to pass 
mandatory-reporting laws to allow for full compliance with the Gun 
Control Act.193 In addition, the federal government could condition 
the issuance of federal NARIP grants on states’ use of these funds to 
research whether prohibitor information in the given state is covered 
by HIPAA, and if it is, to support the passage of legislation requiring 
the submission of only the necessary PHI to NICS.194 
2. Usurpation of State Control over Information Sent to NICS.  
Furthermore, in opposition to the holding in Printz, the HIPAA-
NICS NPRM195 could actually reduce states’ sovereignty to decide 
whether to report to NICS and subsequently, what information to 
report to NICS.196 The NPRM recommends that the HIPAA Privacy 
Rule be amended to create a new use or disclosure197 within the “uses 
and disclosures for specialized government functions” section of the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule.198 Importantly, however, this section is not 
 
 192. For an overview of the holding of Printz that the federal government cannot directly 
require state officials to enforce federal regulatory programs, and a discussion of its implications 
for NICS reporting, see supra notes 86–91 and accompanying text. 
 193. This is a necessary consequence of Printz’s holding. See Printz v. United States, 521 
U.S. 898, 917–18 (1997) (holding that federal statutes that place “conditions upon the grant of 
federal funding” are not the same as “forced participation of the States’ executive in the actual 
administration of the federal program”).  
 194. Subject to certain constitutional limits, Congress may use its taxing and spending 
powers to induce state compliance with federal regulatory programs. See supra note 89 and 
accompanying text. 
 195. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule and the 
National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS), 79 Fed. Reg. 784 (proposed Jan. 
7, 2014) (to amend 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(k)). 
 196. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 918–19 (1997) (explaining that states maintain a “residuary and 
inviolable sovereignty” (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott, 
ed., 1898))). 
 197. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule and the 
National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS), 79 Fed. Reg. at 792. 
 198. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (2014). “A covered entity may use or disclose protected health 
information without the written authorization of the individual . . . or the opportunity for the 
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addressed to states and their disclosure of records, but rather to 
“covered entit[ies].”199 Covered entities must abide by the exceptions 
in this section unless a stricter state privacy law exists,200 or unless 
there is a public-health rationale for abiding by the HIPAA Privacy 
Rule.201 Despite these limitations, however, if the NPRM comes into 
effect, and no stricter state law applies, covered entities, such as 
private hospitals, might not be controlled by the state’s reporting laws 
and would be able to determine what and when to report to NICS.202 
If not governed by state laws, therefore, covered entities might report 
not only pertinent information to NICS, but also unnecessary PHI. 
HHS has responded to this fear, arguing that the HIPAA-NICS 
NPRM poses no federalism concerns because HIPAA-covered 
entities would not be required to disclose information if the disclosure 
of such information is contrary to state law.203 HHS’s response, 
however, ignores the fact that simply allowing covered entities to act 
in the absence of state law or against state law by reporting to NICS 
would completely undermine states’ authority and decisionmaking 
regarding the submission of information to NICS.204 
Although states may supplement the federal requirements 
describing who may own a gun, states, with the encouragement of the 
federal government, should strive to achieve at least uniform policies 
regarding the submission of federal prohibitor information in a way 
that maintains respect for individuals with mental disabilities. A 
HIPAA exception to NICS that allows a wide variety of reporting 
does not foster uniformity, or reflect or respect states’ trend toward 
passing NICS-reporting laws. And, by placing the exception in a 
section of the HIPAA Privacy Rule aimed at covered entities, the 
HIPAA-NICS NPRM could serve to undermine states’ control over 
 
individual to agree or object . . . in the situations covered by this section, subject to the 
applicable requirements of this section.” Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.203 (2014) (outlining preemption-rule exceptions, including when 
“[t]he provision of State law . . . is more stringent than a standard, requirement, or 
implementation specification” of HIPAA). 
 201. Id. (noting that “a standard, requirement, or implementation specification . . . that is 
contrary to a provision of State law preempts the provision of State law” unless the Secretary of 
HHS deems the state-law provision necessary because it “serv[es] a compelling need related to 
public health, safety, or welfare”).  
 202. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 79 Fed. Reg. at 792 (noting that the proposed 
modification would “merely permit, and not require, covered entities to report to the NICS”). 
 203. Id. at 795. 
 204. See supra notes 86–91 and accompanying text. 
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NICS reporting. Perhaps more importantly, by avoiding the use of an 
existing exception, the HIPAA-NICS NPRM proposes a solution that 
is unnecessary and likely to draw more negative attention to the 
mental-health community. 
V.  ALLEVIATING STATES’ CONCERN OF AN OVERLAP BETWEEN 
HIPAA AND NICS 
This Note contends that the HIPAA-NICS NPRM is 
unnecessary—despite states’ and policymakers’ concerns, there is no 
meaningful collision between the NICS provision and the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule. Rather than finalize this unnecessary regulation, the 
federal government should specify, and perhaps reconsider, what 
kinds of information are reportable to NICS. This Part examines the 
reporting laws of Connecticut and Virginia as possible examples that 
other states and the federal government can use to fashion NICS-
reporting laws and regulations. It then outlines additional areas that 
should be addressed by federal NICS regulations that are overlooked 
by the HIPAA-NICS NPRM. 
A. The Virginia and Connecticut NICS-Reporting Laws as a Model 
for Federal and State Governments 
As previously explained, although the federal government 
cannot force states to submit records to NICS,205 once a state agrees to 
do so, it must then abide by a floor of reporting standards established 
by the federal government.206 But the federal government need not 
come up with these standards in isolation. As Justice Brandeis 
remarked in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,207 states may “serve 
as . . . laborator[ies]” for federal legislation.208 Thus, not only can 
other states benefit from looking at the recent NICS-reporting laws of 
states like Virginia and Connecticut, but the federal government 
 
 205. See supra notes 89–90. 
 206. Under federal law, information that must be submitted to NICS includes whether an 
individual “has been adjudicated as a mental defective or has been committed to any mental 
institution,” 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) (2012), and information as to any person “who has been 
adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution,” id. 
§ 922(g)(4).  
 207. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932).  
 208. See id. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal 
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try 
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). 
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might also learn from observing the results of these laboratories of 
democracy. 
This Section provides a brief overview of recent NICS-reporting 
laws. It then probes the specific requirements of the Connecticut and 
Virginia mental-health reporting laws, identifying them as potential 
state-law experiments that the federal government might follow. 
1. The Increase in Mental-Disability NICS-Reporting Laws.  As 
previously noted, recent events have highlighted the potential 
dangers of gun possession by the mentally ill, despite the dubious 
legitimacy of this fear.209 States have responded by passing their own 
NICS legislation, some with more expansive reporting requirements 
than those required by the federal statute. Some states, such as 
Connecticut210 and Virginia,211 have passed laws that more effectively 
balance the privacy rights of individuals with mental illnesses with the 
aim of lowering the rate of shootings by such individuals. Others, such 
as New York,212 might have overstepped constitutional limits by 
 
 209. Scientific studies have shown no clear connection between gun violence and mental 
illness, absent additional characteristics. See Luo & McIntire, supra note 83, at 30 (explaining 
that research has shown that people with serious mental illnesses “like schizophrenia, major 
depression or bipolar disorder, do pose an increased risk of violence,” and that substance abuse 
is a particularly “powerful predictor of violence”); Donna M. Norris, Marilyn Price, Thomas 
Gutheil, & William H. Reid, Firearm Laws, Patients, and the Roles of Psychiatrists, 163 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 1392, 1394–95 (2006) (explaining that although “mentally ill persons are often one 
focus of firearms legislation,” research suggests that such a relationship only exists in the 
context of “major mental illness” when combined with substance abuse and a history of 
violence). 
 210. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-500 (Supp. 2014). In Connecticut, the Commissioner of 
Mental Health and Addiction Services works with the courts to keep a record of the “cases 
relating to persons with psychiatric disabilities.” Id. § 17a-500(a). Specifically, “Each court of 
probate shall keep a record of the cases relating to persons with psychiatric disabilities . . . and 
the disposition of them” and these records shall be “sealed and available only to the respondent 
or his or her counsel unless the Court of Probate, after hearing held with notice to the 
respondent, determines such records should be disclosed for cause shown.” Id. § 17a-500(a). 
The Commissioner of Mental Health and Addiction Services shall maintain information on 
commitment orders by the probate court as well as on voluntary admissions, and “shall provide 
such information to the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection . . . in such 
a manner as to report identifying information on the commitment or voluntary admission status 
. . . for a person who applies for or holds a permit or certificate” for a gun. Id. § 17a-500(b). 
 211. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-819 (2014) (mandating that mental-health diagnosis and 
treatment information should not be disseminated to the state’s criminal-records exchange 
along with involuntary- or voluntary-commitment records or certifications of temporary 
detention orders for gun possession).  
 212. N.Y. Secure Firearms and Ammunition Enforcement (SAFE) Act, S.B. 2230, 2388 S. 
Assemb. (N.Y. 2013) (amending multiple New York laws to better enforce the submission of 
mental-health-prohibitor information to NICS). 
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requiring providers of mental-health care to report “as soon as 
practicable” to NICS if a patient is likely to hurt himself or others. 
This directive potentially intrudes upon individuals’ constitutional 
right to privacy.213 
2. Connecticut’s Law on Mental-Health Reporting.  After the 
Virginia Tech shooting, Connecticut passed a law requiring that 
mental-health records be sent to NICS in accordance with the federal 
standards.214 For the past fourteen years, Connecticut has sent to 
NICS the records of persons involuntarily committed to a mental-
health facility, found incompetent to stand trial, or found not guilty 
due to insanity.215 In 2013, however, Connecticut amended its firearm-
permit law to also exclude from obtaining the required firearm permit 
those who have “been voluntarily admitted on or after October 1, 
2013, to a hospital for persons with psychiatric disabilities.”216 Thus, in 
addition to individuals who have been involuntarily committed, 
individuals who have voluntarily admitted themselves to an inpatient 
psychiatric facility cannot receive a firearm permit or eligibility 
certificate, nor can they possess any firearm for six months following 
 
 213. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.46(b) (McKinney Supp. 2014). New York’s law has 
received attention and backlash from the press and citizens for its unusually extreme approach 
to the reporting of mental-health information. See, e.g., McCreary, supra note 46, at 859 
(describing New York’s gun-control law as potentially going too far in infringing the 
confidentiality of patients who seek mental-health treatment); Jessica Bakeman, Mental-health 
Officials Clash on N.Y. Gun Law Reporting, USA TODAY (Mar. 24, 2013 12:03 AM), available 
at http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/03/24/mental-health-new-york-gun-law/2011
399 (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (noting that psychiatrists and law-enforcement officials objected 
to the New York law, which could require them to report patients who are a danger to 
themselves or others); see generally Luo & McIntire, supra note 83 (chronicling the difficult law-
enforcement issues raised by gun ownership among the mentally ill, but also giving voice to the 
concern among “mental health professionals . . . that new seizure laws might stigmatize many 
people who have no greater propensity for violence than the broader population”). 
 214. Maureen Groppe, Checking Gun Buyers for Mental Illness Hinges on States, USA 
TODAY (Mar. 28, 2013, 11:03 PM), available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/
03/28/gun-control-background-checks-mentally-ill/2028689. Before the Virginia Tech incident, 
only four states had laws explicitly requiring agencies to share relevant mental-health records 
with NICS. MAYORS AGAINST ILLEGAL GUNS, supra note 19, at 14. These states were Alabama 
(whose law had been in place since 2004), Colorado (since 2002), Connecticut (since 2005), and 
Georgia (since 2005). Id.  
 215. Wilson, supra note 81. 
 216. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29–28(b)(5)(B) (Supp. 2014) (emphasis added). Compare the 
language in CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29–28(b)(5)(B), which does include “voluntarily committed,” 
with that of CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29–28 (2009) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29–28 
(Supp. 2014)), which does not include the “voluntarily committed” language of the 2013 version. 
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discharge from the hospital.217 The inclusion of individuals who 
voluntarily choose to be committed might seem somewhat 
overinclusive, but it arguably supports the underlying aim of the Gun 
Control Act—to keep firearms out of the hands of those deemed 
unfit or dangerous.218 
One argument against the Connecticut law and in favor of 
allowing the purchase and possession of firearms by individuals who 
have been voluntarily committed is that if a person is rational enough 
to seek treatment, he is rational enough to decide whether to 
purchase a gun.219 Often, however, those who submit voluntarily to 
mental-health treatment have the support of family and friends who 
encourage or financially induce them to seek treatment. If individuals 
who voluntarily commit themselves were to possess a gun, they might 
be just as dangerous as someone who had been involuntarily 
committed.220 
Connecticut’s NICS-submission infrastructure and its inclusion 
of voluntary commitments may serve as an important example of how 
a state or federal government can structure its NICS-reporting laws to 
avoid a potential HIPAA violation and exclude potentially dangerous 
individuals who voluntarily committed themselves. Further, its limit 
of six months postdischarge for the reporting of said information 
serves as a reminder to state and federal governments to consider 
individuals’ privacy and Second Amendment rights in the creation of 
NICS-reporting laws. 
3. Virginia’s Law on Mental-Health Reporting.  Virginia’s NICS-
reporting legislation has also been successful in increasing the amount 
of relevant prohibitor information submitted to NICS, and thus serves 
as an example for other states and the federal government to follow. 
 
 217. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29–28(b)(5)(B); see also Mary E. O’Leary, Connecticut Gun Law: 
Breakdown of When New Rules Go into Effect, NEW HAVEN REG. (Apr. 6, 2013, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.nhregister.com/general-news/20130406/connecticut-gun-law-breakdown-of-when-
new-rules-go-into-effect-2 (explaining the mental-health-eligibility component of the gun-
permit bill). Recall that the ATF’s NICS regulatory definitions state that “committed to a 
mental institution” does not include anyone who has “been in a mental institution for 
observation or a voluntary admission to a mental institution.” 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2014). 
 218. See 114 CONG. REC. 21,784 (1968) (statement of Rep. Celler) (“No one can dispute the 
need to prevent drug addicts, mental incompetents, persons with a history of mental 
disturbances, and persons convicted of certain offenses, from buying, owning, or possessing 
firearms.”). 
 219. McCreary, supra note 46, at 860. 
 220. Id. 
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As with the federal prohibitor requirements, Virginia’s NICS-
submission requirements track Virginia’s laws as to who is unable to 
purchase or own a gun in Virginia—“any person who has been 
adjudicated . . . mentally incapacitated.”221 Virginia amended its gun 
control law in 2008222 to clarify that “involuntarily committed” 
includes not only inpatient commitments, but also orders requiring 
“mandatory outpatient treatment,” as well as voluntary admissions 
from “temporary detention orders.”223 Because NICS-reporting 
requirements parallel the state’s gun laws, following the passage of 
this law, individuals like Seung Hui Cho, who was committed to an 
outpatient facility before his shooting spree at Virginia Tech,224 would 
no longer be exempted from NICS reporting. 
Virginia also recognizes that, in some cases, even voluntary 
commitments should be reported to NICS. Virginia’s 2008 
amendments also clarified that an individual will be denied the ability 
to purchase, possess, or transport a firearm if he was voluntarily 
admitted, and the voluntary admission “was the subject of a 
temporary detention order . . . [in which he] subsequently agreed to 
voluntary admission.”225 These changes seem to have increased the 
number of mental-health records sent to NICS; by October 2012, 
Virginia had submitted more mental-health-prohibitor records (per 
capita) to NICS than any other state.226 
In June 2014, Virginia again amended its NICS-reporting law to 
address the concern that the reporting of both involuntary and 
voluntary admissions to the Virginia Central Criminal Records 
Exchange (CCRE)—the point of contact for NICS—would 
undermine the confidentiality of patients’ mental-health records.227 
 
 221. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.1:2 (2014). 
 222. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.1:3(A) (2008) (current version at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
308.1:3(A) (2014)) (noting, without greater detail, that the purchase of a firearm will be denied 
to “any person involuntarily committed”). 
 223. Id. § 18.2-308.1:3 (2014) (“It shall be unlawful for any person involuntarily admitted to 
a facility or ordered to mandatory outpatient treatment pursuant to § 19.2-169.2, involuntarily 
admitted to a facility or ordered to mandatory outpatient treatment as the result of a 
commitment hearing . . . to purchase, possess or transport a firearm.”). 
 224. VA. TECH REVIEW PANEL, supra note 15, at 48. 
 225. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.1:3A (2008) (current version at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
308.1:3(A) (2014)).  
 226. Groppe, supra note 214. 
 227. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-819 (Supp. 2014); see generally Behavioral Health and 
Development Services, VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2 (Supp. 2014) (failing to mention that an 
adjudication of mental “deficiency” or disability should be reportable to NICS).  
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The law now maintains that for orders from a commitment hearing 
for involuntary admission or mandatory outpatient treatment, and 
“certification[s] of any person who has been the subject of a detention 
order” based on a judge or special justice’s determination “that he 
will be prohibited from possessing a firearm” and will “subsequently 
agree[] to voluntary admission,” must also be sent by the court clerk 
to the CCRE.228 Importantly, the statute added a section stating that 
“[n]o medical records shall be forwarded to the Criminal Records 
Exchange with any form, order, or certification.”229 By mandating that 
submission will include only information pertaining to the NICS 
prohibitor and not the actual medical records, this stipulation 
alleviates health-care providers’ concerns that PHI will be 
inappropriately submitted to the CCRE and NICS. 
One might consider, however, whether a finding of 
dangerousness should accompany a commitment for purposes of 
NICS submission. Currently, a finding of dangerousness or inability 
to manage one’s affairs is required for an adjudication “as a mental 
defective.”230 Virginia’s law and others like it could be strengthened 
by federal legislation requiring such a finding in commitments as well 
as adjudications to prohibit an individual from purchasing or 
possessing a firearm. The HIPAA-NICS NPRM would do nothing to 
ensure that states find a condition of “dangerousness” in both 
situations before reporting the names of such individuals to NICS. 
B. Additional Recommendations for Federal NICS-Reporting 
Guidelines 
State laws provide some helpful suggestions for the federal 
government to consider in fleshing out the federal NICS-reporting 
requirements. These laws also highlight areas in which the federal 
government must pay special attention when creating or amending 
existing NICS legislation or regulations. In January 2014, the ATF 
responded to the states’ confusion on the federal NICS-reporting 
requirements by suggesting an amendment to the definition of 
“committed to a mental institution” that would clarify that 
involuntary commitment includes both inpatient and outpatient 
 
 228. Id. § 37.2-819(A). 
 229. Id. § 37.2-819(D). 
 230. See supra notes 100−02 and accompanying text. 
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treatment.231 This proposal has since been codified, but as previously 
mentioned,232 although these amendments will resolve some 
confusion, it will remain unclear under these federal guidelines 
precisely what process is necessary for an involuntary commitment as 
well as who can be the “lawful authority.” 
This Section addresses how the federal government must further 
elucidate the definition of “commitment.” It then considers the due-
process concerns inherent in the current federal reporting structure, 
and suggests ways in which the federal government might ameliorate 
such concerns. Finally, this Section highlights non-HIPAA-related 
NICS issues that the federal government should address to increase 
the amount of mental-health reporting to NICS and thereby improve 
NICS’s success rate in preventing individuals who fall under the 
mental-health prohibitor from purchasing firearms. 
1. Further Defining “Commitment” and “Other Lawful 
Authority.”  Although the ATF has clarified the Gun Control Act’s 
commitment requirement,233 the meaning of “commitment” is still 
uncertain. The ATF should elucidate whether a temporary or 
emergency commitment can constitute a “commitment” under the 
Gun Control Act and, in addition to explaining what is required for 
an adjudication, detail what process is required for a commitment to 
satisfy the federal requirements.234 In addition, both the 
“commitment” and “adjudicated as a mental defective” provisions 
include language authorizing “other lawful authority” to legally 
determine whether an individual is committed or adjudicated for the 
purposes of NICS submission.235 However, there is no guidance in the 
ATF regulations as to who “other lawful authority” includes. The 
ATF or HHS should also clarify whether a commitment decision by 
an attending provider, rather than a judge, should be classified as 
 
 231. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule and the 
National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS), 79 Fed. Reg. 784, 775 (proposed 
Jan. 7, 2014) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 164). 
 232. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 233. See Amended Definition of “Adjudicated as a Mental Defective” and “Committed to a 
Mental Institution,” 79 Fed. Reg. 774, 775 (proposed Jan. 7, 2014) (amending 47 C.F.R. 
§ 478.11). 
 234. Id. 
 235. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
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PHI, and if so, whether it can be exempted from HIPAA for NICS-
reporting purposes.236 
A solution to the confusion as to what constitutes “commitment” 
and “other lawful authority” for purposes of NICS reporting should 
be promulgated at the federal level, whether by the ATF, HHS, 
another governmental agency, or Congress, to allow for consistency. 
In the interim, states and federal courts must ensure there is a 
controlled process in place to determine the dangerousness of those 
who voluntarily accept treatment or who are committed temporarily 
on an emergency basis. Alternatively, the Secretary of HHS could 
determine that this commitment information is necessary to public 
health and therefore not in violation of the HIPAA Privacy Rule.237 
Either proposal would support the aims of the Gun Control Act, 
clarify the process for taking away an individual’s Second 
Amendment right to bear arms, and prevent further stigmatization of 
individuals seeking mental-health treatment. 
2. Potential Due-Process Concerns.  Some courts have also held 
that Heller and McDonald add a constitutional due-process 
component to the right to possess firearms.238 Ordinarily, to deprive 
an individual of liberty or property there must be an adjudicatory 
hearing in which the parties may “offer and test evidence if facts are 
in dispute.”239 Therefore, the ATF, HHS, or Congress should 
 
 236. See LIU ET AL., supra note 56, at 4 (questioning whether a health-care provider “would 
be considered an ‘other lawful authority,’” thereby allowing the individual committed by a 
physician (rather than by a judge) to fall within the definition of “committed to a mental 
institution” for purposes of the Gun Control Act).  
 237. See supra notes 169−73 and accompanying text; OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 
133, at 17 (explaining the role of the Secretary of HHS in determining whether a state law “is 
necessary for purposes of serving a compelling public health, safety, or welfare need”). 
 238. See United States v. Rehlander, 666 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 2012) (noting that the right to 
possess firearms is “no longer something that can be withdrawn by government on a permanent 
and irrevocable basis without due process”). 
 239. Id.; see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267–68 (1970) (holding that “the 
opportunity to be heard must be tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to 
be heard,” and that in some cases, written submissions are not enough to satisfy an individual’s 
due-process requirements); United States v. Emond, 2:12-cr-44, 2012 WL 4964506, at *6 (D. Me. 
Oct. 17, 2012) (quoting Rehlander, 666 F.3d at 48). “The defendant argue[d] that his status as an 
‘unlawful user of drugs’ ha[d] not been adjudicated, and he ha[d] not been provided with notice 
or an opportunity to be heard regarding the applicability of § 922(g)(3) to him.” Id. at 7. The 
court recognized the due-process requirement for an adjudication under Heller and Rehlander 
to turn on whether an individual has the Second Amendment right to possess a gun. 
Nevertheless, the court determined that the defendant had been provided with the necessary 
notice and opportunity to be heard on § 922(g)(3)’s application to him. Id.  
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determine what process is required for adjudications that decide 
whether an individual is capable of possessing a firearm.240 
Although procedural protections are necessary to afford due 
process, one might also question whether courts’ focus on the formal 
procedures that must occur before an individual is reported under the 
mental-health prohibitor might stray from the Gun Control Act’s aim. 
This aim, as expressed in Chamberlain, ensures that individuals who 
are “mentally unstable” or “irresponsible” cannot purchase or possess 
firearms.241 If the focus of gun control is to remain on the types of 
people who should or should not possess guns, then a rigid 
preoccupation with procedural requirements might ignore or stymie 
the success of this aim. Perhaps additional focus should be given to 
ensuring that in all proceedings, regardless of formality, those who 
have been deemed “dangerous” (by a judge, attending physician, or 
other legal authority) are prohibited from purchasing a gun—at least 
until such a finding has been overturned. 
3. Non-HIPAA-Related Failings of the NICS Program.  Finally, 
the federal government should attend to the non-HIPAA-related 
reasons for states’ failure to submit mental-health records.242 These 
include requiring organizations to update aging computer systems and 
to integrate existing record systems—a task that is particularly 
pertinent to mental-health records, given that they often come from 
various sources within the state, including courts, private hospitals, 
and mental-health departments.243 The federal government should 
also encourage states to examine the efficacy of their privacy laws, 
which are likely more of an impediment to NICS-information 
submission than is the HIPAA Privacy Rule.244 In addition, the 
federal government can more effectively use NARIP grants to 
qualifying states by including in them state-specific advice and 
assistance to help qualifying states remove barriers to NICS 
submission.245 
 
 240. For a discussion of how federal courts of appeals have undertaken this task, see supra 
Part II.B.2.  
 241. United States v. Chamberlain, 159 F.3d 656, 660 (1998) (citing H.R. 17735, 90th Cong. 
2d Sess. (1968), 114 CONG. REC. 21,780, 21,791, 21,832, 22,270 (1968)). 
 242. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 19, at 11. 
 243. Id. at 11–12. 
 244. Id. at 12–14. 
 245. Id. at 12. 
PEARL IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2014  6:19 PM 
604 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:559 
CONCLUSION 
The HIPAA Privacy Rule is generally understood to stand for 
the protection of health records from disclosure to outside parties—a 
goal that seems diametrically opposed to the Gun Control Act’s 
purpose of encouraging the reporting of information to NICS. It is 
easy to see, therefore, why some states, governmental and 
nongovernmental organizations, and politicians fear that the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule prevents states from reporting mental-health 
information to NICS, and thus, why HHS has proposed an exception 
in the HIPAA-NICS NPRM. As this Note argues, however, the 
relationship between the Gun Control Act, NICS, and the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule is more nuanced than a strict comparison of their 
general aims would imply. The current HIPAA Privacy Rule is not a 
barrier to states’ submission of mental-health information to NICS. 
NICS requires only that certain mental-health information be 
admitted, and the HIPAA Privacy Rule pertains only to covered 
entities, which, for the most part, do not create or house this 
information and are not responsible for submitting it to NICS. 
Furthermore, the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s exceptions to disclosure 
allow states to remain HIPAA compliant.246 
Existing alternatives to the creation of a NICS exception to the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule will likely be more effective at meeting the 
reciprocal aims of strengthening NICS and decreasing national gun 
violence. The HIPAA-NICS NPRM therefore seems to be predicated 
on a misappraisal of the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s relation to NICS and 
an overarching desire to address the national fear of gun violence by 
those who are mentally ill without engaging in a thorough analysis of 
the rule’s necessity and impact. 
 
 
 246. HHS has also not been able to identify any states with laws authorizing, but not 
requiring, the submission of mental-health-prohibitor information to NICS in which the mental-
health-prohibitor information originates in, or is stored by, a covered entity. See HIPAA 
Privacy Rule and NICS, 79 Fed. Reg. 784, 792 (proposed Jan. 7, 2014) (amending 45 C.F.R. 
§ 164.512(k)) (proposing the NICS exception to the HIPAA Privacy Rule to permit covered 
entities to report to NICS if necessary in the given state, but naming no states to which it would 
apply). 
